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ABSTRACT
The aim of this dissertation is to focus on a determinant aspect of Corporate Finance that is 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A). This dissertation not only provides a practical analysis of 
main issued regarding a process of M&A, but also provides a theoretical framework about 
M&A.
Specifically, this dissertation explores the real case of Kraft Foods - world’s second largest 
manufacturer and packager food products – and Cadbury - the world’s second largest 
confectionery firm.
Despite Food & Beverage Industry being a non-cyclical industry is a highly competitive one, 
where players compete for price, quality, innovation, brand recognition and loyalty. 
Together, Kraft Foods and Cadbury will become the largest manufacturer and packager food 
products in the world. Benefiting from economies of scale, Kraft Foods will be more efficient 
and better price competitive than its competitors.
Kraft Foods should acquire Cadbury through a tender offer. Synergies are estimated to be 25% 
of Cadbury’s market capitalization at 9th of November of 2009. The price offered should be 
£7.93 for each Cadbury’s share. To conclude, Kraft Foods should pay 88% in Debt and 12% in 
Cash through an emission of more than 90 million new shares. 
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1. Introduction 
The aim of this dissertation is to focus on a determinant aspect of Corporate Finance that is 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A). In order to achieve that, it is necessary to present two firms 
and their respective strategic and financial reasons to justify a process of M&A.  Specifically, 
this dissertation explores the real case of Kraft Foods - world’s second largest manufacturer and 
packager of food products – and Cadbury - the world’s second largest confectionery firm. 
This dissertation not only provides a practical analysis of the main issue regarding a process of 
M&A, but also theoretical framework about M&A.
The first part of the dissertation is composed by the literature review section where a 
compendium of diverse academic articles regarding valuation process and aspects related to 
M&A deals is presented, such as type of acquisitions, M&A activity and methods of payment. 
This theoretical part is going to be used as a guideline for the practical part – valuation and 
acquisitions section.
The second part is the industry and firms analysis section. The Food & Beverage and 
Confectionery Industry are going to be introduced and its performance accessed through present 
and past data. In addition, Kraft Foods and Cadbury are going to be described and analysed 
based on the information collected in their interim reports. This section is highly important to 
help identify the market drivers in the each industry and to understand the determinant factors 
that made Kraft Foods and Cadbury grow over time.  
Afterwards the performance forecast section is presented, where Kraft Foods’ and Cadbury’s 
standalone valuations are defined, according to the literature guidelines. To access the value of 
each firm it was created a model with its respective assumptions. To analyse the M&A process, 
another model was created but this time to access the merged value and the mix of synergies 
created. 
After concluding the valuation process, the last section is dedicated to the acquisition offer. This 
section is going to be partially explored by addressing how the synergy’s benefits should be 
distributed and how much Kraft Foods should pay for Cadbury. Also, in this section are
presented some models that can help to certify if there are enough mix of synergies to 
compensate the premium offered and if the expectable synergies are plausible or not.
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2. About Valuation Methods 
Value the value is the basis of market economy (Copeland, T.E., et al, 2000). To have access to 
the performance of an investment, a bond, a derivative or a firm’s share, it is indispensable to 
measure the amount of the value it creates. According to Luehrman (1997), every resource-
allocation decision a firm makes lies in what that move is worth and if the firm estimates that 
that value is a key driver of the firm’s overall performance. 
In the M&A process, valuation is the most important component in the analysis (Hitchner, 
2006). However, given the multiplicity of valuation methods it is important to understand their 
inputs to better apply them, since they “are different ways of expressing the same underlying 
model” (Young, M. et al, 1999).
Young’s classification first characteristic is based on the distinction of methods focus on Equity 
Values – this approach estimates the value of a firm to equity holders - and methods focus on 
Enterprise Value – while these approach values the whole enterprise, not only the equity but 
also the debt.
Second characteristic of Young’s classification is the distinction between cash-flows, returns 
and multiples. Damodaran (2002), defines that cash-flow assumes the value of an asset that 
corresponds to the present value of all expected future cash-flows. Whereas Returns-Based 
approaches are focused on the capital stock and the spread between the return and cost of 
capital. (Young, M.et al, 1999). 
At last, Multiples (Relative Valuation) is based on the principle that a firm’s asset can be 
compared with other similar firms in the same industry by using a multiple (Damodaran, 2002).
The value is estimated by multiplying the ratio, or multiple, from the comparable firm by the 
performance measure for the firm being valued (Kaplan et al., 1996).
Multiples
Dividend Yield
Enterprise Value to Capital
Enterprise - Value to EBITDA
Dynaminc ROE Economic Value Added
Dividend Discount Model Discounted Cash Flow
P/B Value




P/E Ratio Enterprise - Value to EBIT
Table  1 - Valuation Methods
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According to Luerhman (1999), most firms use a set of approaches to better estimate value, but 
discounted-cash flow analysis (DCF) is considered the best practice for valuation, despite 
valuation models being always a function of three factors – cash, timing and risk.
In this dissertation only Free Cash Flow to the Firm (FCFF), Adjusted Present Value (APV) –
both methods belong to cash-flow approaches –and Relative Valuation are going to be used in 
the valuation process. 
3. Cash Flow Approaches
These approaches are heavily based on assumptions and can be explained in two steps. The first 
step is to forecast the future cash flows of a firm, which means the future intrinsic value of a 
firm’s assets for each period on the analysis, the second step is to discount the forecasts to 
present value at a properly discount rate that reflects the riskiness of those streams (Luehrman, 
1997). 
3.1. Free Cash Flow to the Firm (FCFF)
Free Cash Flow to the Firm is the most common used valuation technique to compute Enterprise 
Value. This approach consists in discounting all the firm’s expected cash flows using the 











Free Cash Flow is the cash generated by an all-equity financed project to distribute to all its 
suppliers of capital (Kester, W. et al., 1995), prior to operating expenses, taxes and reinvestment 
needs, but before any payment of interests to debt-holders or dividends to stockholders 
(Damodaran, 2002).
     =     	(1 −   ) +               −        	            −	∆	       	       	
There is no mention of tax benefits, such as interest tax shields,  in computing FCFF because the 
WACC is computed after-taxes and already captures them (Damodaran, 2002).
Explicit Period Terminal Value
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3.2. Terminal Value (TV)
FCFF approach is divided in two stages, the first one that represents the present value of cash 
flow for an explicit period of time and the second one, that represents a Terminal Value. Since it 
is impossible to compute firms’ cash flows forever, after the explicit period is determined the 
Terminal Value that represents the firms’ value at that period (Damodaran, 2002).
This Terminal Value is heavily dependent on the growth rate that cash flows are expected to 
grow as and the discount rate. 
3.3. Growth Rate (g)
According to Damodaran (2005), growth rate is the critical input in valuation process, since it 
determines how revenues and earnings will evolve in the future. 
To determine a consistent growth rate, Damadoran (2005), suggests observing the firms’ past 
earnings (historical growth rates) or to estimate the growth rate accordingly with the firms’ 
fundamentals, based on the firms’ reinvestment rate and return on capital.
  =             	    	 ×       	  	       
            	     =	





3.4. Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
The weighted average cost of capital (WACC) is the most commonly-used DFC approach that 
represents the opportunity cost of investing capital in projects with similar risk and duration; it 
is difficult to measure it reliably because it is an excepted rate of return. The opportunity cost of 
capital varies differently depending on the firm and business’ risk
This method is quite contested by academics. Modigliani & Miller (1958) defended that 
managers by changing a firm’s capital structure cannot change a firm’s value.. For some 
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academics1, it is a valid and simple model suitable for less complex structural firms. Others 
believe that this method is obsolete, since it is a method suitable only for simple firms with a 
stable capital structure, tax position or fund-raising strategy2. They also argued that WACC is 
modeled to handle with financial side effects automatically, but only for interest tax shields 
according to very inflexible assumptions (Luehrman, 1997). 
To successfully implement the cost of capital it is very important to analyse the components 
that the WACC embraces: the cost of equity, the after-tax cost of debt, and the company’s target 







× (1 −   )
3.5. Cost of Equity
The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) was first introduced by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) 
& Mossin (1966) and allows pricing securities by exploring the relationship between the risk of 
an asset and its expected return. This model is focused only on non-diversifying risk, since 
investors can reduce their exposure to other risks – specific to that security - by diversifying 
their investments. 
Based on a set of assumptions3, this model allows to reach a benchmark rate of return for 
investments. 
 (  ) = 	   +   (   −   )
Where  (  ) is the security expected return,    is the risk-free rate,    is security’s beta and 
   is the expected return on the stock market as a whole. These components are going to be 
mentioned later. 
The cost of equity is defined as the expected return on a company’s stock and the expected 
return is the shareholder’s opportunity cost of the equity funds employed by the company 
(Mullins, Jr., 1982). Therefore, using CAPM makes it possible to compute the firm’s cost of 
equity levered and unlevered. The use of debt makes the firm riskier than an all-equity firm, 
since it faces the existence of distress costs. Because of that, the cost of equity turns out to be 
more expensive. That is why the cost of equity unlevered is smaller than cost of equity levered. 
                                                  
1Damodaran, A. (2002) Investment Valuation 2nd Edition. New York: Wiley Finance.
2 When is expected that the firm will vary its capital structure it is needed to make adjustments not only project by project, as well as 
period by period in each project (Luehrman, 1997).
3The model assumes a perfect capital market (no taxes on returns or transaction costs), also that all investors are mean-variance 
optimizers and all with homogeneous expectations and beliefs, and that they can borrow and lend any amount at a fixed risk-free 
rate.
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   =	   +   (   −   )
   =	   +   (   −   )
3.6. Risk-free rate
According to Damodaran (2005), risk can be defined as “the likelihood that we will receive a 
return on an investment that is different from the return we expected to make”.
By this definition a risk-free rate is when the outcome of an investment is expected with 
certainty, meaning there is no default risk. The default risk is measured with a bond rating and 
the interest rate is computed by adding a default spread to the riskless rate (Damodaran, 2002).
Since any firm has a measure of default risk for larger or safest it can be common practice to 
view government securities - Treasury Bills (short-term) and Treasury Bonds (long-term) – as 
risk-free assets.
In valuation Treasury Bonds are used more often. Copeland, T. et al (2000) indicates for 
valuation purposes a 10-year Treasury Bond4, however it is imperative to have consistency 
between the risk-free rate and the cash-flows’ period in the analysis process.
3.7. Beta ( )
Beta is a measure of sensitivity. In the CAPM beta represents a stock’s incremental risk to a 
diversified investor, where risk is defined as how the stock co-varies with the market (Copeland, 





To estimate a firms’ beta, in the valuation process, accordingly to Copeland, T. el al (2000), it is 
better to use an industry-derived unlevered beta re-levered to the firms’ capital structure, since 
firms’ specific betas vary too much to be reliable. 
   =     1 +
 
 
× (1 −   ) 
                                                  
4For developed economies.
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3.8. Equity– Risk Premium (   −  )
Equity risk premium is a key component in many pricing models5 and it can be defined as the
compensation risk for the expected return on any investment. It is the difference between the 
market risk and the risk-free rate. The market risk reflects the expected returns on all risky 
investments as a whole. 
According to Damodaran (2005), the equity risk premium is what investors see in an 
economy/market and what price they should attach to that risk. Equity premium risk is the main 
responsible in how investors allocate wealth and in which type of securities they invest.
The equity risk premium is determined by several macroeconomic, volatility and behavioral 
factors. Damodaran (2005) mentioned some, such as risk aversion – if investors become more 
risk averse, the equity premium will increase -, economic risk – general concerns about the 
overall economy, information – the quality and quantity of information available to investors 
may affect their investment decisions and their confidence level on it, liquidity – illiquidity 
assets demand a higher premium, catastrophic risk – the risk of a drop in economy output or a 
default by the government, behavioral irrational component – investors do not always behave 
rationally. 
Copeland, T. et al (2000) presents three essential pointers to estimate equity risk premium:
 Measuring and extrapolating historical returns;
 Regression analysis to link current market variables to project the expected market risk 
premium;
 Using reverse engineering to assess the market’s cost of capital using DFC valuation. 
4. Adjusted Present Value (APV)
One alternative to the Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) is the Adjusted Present 
Value (APV), introduced by Myers (1974), which is considered a better tool, since it “always 
works when WACC does not” (Luerhman, 1997). 
The main advantages of APV over WACC are its flexibility and transparence, since it allows 
managers to segregate and analyse separately the different components of value. 
The fundamental idea behind APV is “value additivity” (Luerhman, 1997), following the 
propositions of Modigliani & Miller, and it can be explained in three steps. In the first step, it 
                                                  
5 Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), Arbitrage Pricing Model (APM), Multi-Factor Model, Proxy Models (Damodaran, 2005).
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The second step, it evaluates the financing side effect by adding them to the firm’s unlevered 
value, such as interest tax shields, cost of financial distress, subsidies, hedges and issue costs. 
In the literature is discussed that tax shields should be discounted at an appropriate risk-adjusted 
rate, however there is no agreement on how risky tax shields are. Accordingly with Luerhman 
(1997), the average firms’ cost of debt is commonly used with an upward adjustment. However, 
Copeland, T. el al (2000) defends that interest tax shields should also be discounted by cost of 
equity unlevered rate, since firms will manage its debt-to-value ratio to a target level - making 
debt grow with the business - so the value of interest tax shield will track the risk of operating 
assets. 
      = 
  	 ×   ×   
(1 +   ) 
+







The third step is to evaluate expected bankruptcy costs given the firms’ level of debt.
      =            	  	       	 ×   	  	  
This estimate is considered the most challenging in the APV approach, since the probability of 
default and bankruptcy costs cannot be estimated directly. To estimate the probability of default 
it is necessary to estimate a bond rating for each level of debt, and estimate their probability of 
default separately.The bankruptcy cost is a statistical probability that needs to take into account 
the firms’ characteristics and the firms’ level of debt (Damodaran, 2002).
Finally, the Enterprise Value is given by:
          	      =            	          +   	(   ) −   	(   )
This “additivity” characteristic allows to understand by segregating all business operations 
components, as well as interest tax shields and bankruptcy costs, where and how the value is 
being created. 
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5. Relative Valuation
Goedhart et al (2005), Damadoran (2005), Copeland, T. el al (2000), defended that a careful 
analysis comparing a firm’s multiples with its peers can lead to a more accurate valuation, since 
some errors in estimating firms’ value by using DFC approach are very common, especially in 
computing firms’ return on invested capital (ROIC), growth rate and its weighted average cost 
of capital. 
The value is estimated by multiplying the ratio or multiple from the comparable firm by the 
performance measure of the firm being evaluated (Kaplan et al., 1996).
Relative valuation is based in two components. First, to value assets in relative value, prices 
have to be standardized by using multiples of earnings, book values or sales. Second, the peers 
must be comparable firms taking into account risk, growth, cash flows, as well as returns on 
invested capital and capital structures (Goedhart et al, 2005; Damodaran, 2005).
Goedhart et al. (2005) defends the use of forward-looking multiples for a more accurate 
valuation, which means a multiple that can forecast profits. Goedhart also defends the use of 
enterprise-value multiples instead of equity-value multiples since they are less affected by the 
capital structure they are not vulnerable to manipulation. 
Kaplan et al. (1996), also defends the use of EBITDA, EBIT, net income and revenue to 
perform the valuation. 
The disadvantage of this approach is that comparable firms are very difficult to find, since it is 
very difficult to match return on invested capital and growth expectations (Goedhart et al, 
2005). The lack of assumptions in this approach can lead to a biased analysis, since this method 
is vulnerable to manipulation, such as the P/E ratio that can be artificially increased by 
swapping debt for equity (Goedhart et al., 2005). At last, it is important to use multiples in a 
consistent manner to avoid the creation of misleading valuations. 
6. Cross-Border Valuation 
Cross-border investments are a prominent internationalization strategy that is responsible for a 
significant impact in economy’s value creation, since in the last decades. Cross-border trends 
and growth factors are mentioned later6 in this thesis. 
This topic will focus on the most common approaches to evaluate cross-border investments and 
the major issues that commonly affect such valuations. 
                                                  
6 Cross-Border Trends Section 
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In a general perspective, the basic considerations for a cross-border investment should be the 
same as for a domestic acquisition; nevertheless in a cross-border there are more risk 
dimensions that must be taken into account and because of that valuation metrics must be 
adjusted.
6.1. Relative Valuation
In a cross-border transaction, the use of multiples is also a complementary approach and must 
follow the same consistence in the valuation process like in as the domestic transactions. 
Nevertheless, according to Zenner el al., (2008), the main problem is that in many countries 
there is a scarcity of comparable firms or transactions per country and industry. 
6.2. Discounted Cash Flows Method
This approach is more flexible to adjust and, at the same time, more challenge, due to the 
difficulties in estimating future cash flows and the discounting rate in cross-borders (Zenner, M. 
et al., 2008). In the literature there are two different methods to apply the DFC approach 
(Kester, W., et al., 1995), however both paths require an appropriate adjusted-discount rate: 
 Method A: Discounting Foreign-Currency Cash Flows:
 This method involves converting the Net Present Value to the Home Currency 
at the spot exchange rate. The cash-flows are discounted at foreign-currency 
rate;
 Method B: Discounting Foreign-Currency Cash Flows converted to Home Currency:
 This method involves the conversion of foreign currency amounts into home 
currency and the subsequent discounting of the converted cash flows at the 
home-currency discount rate;
Although both methods should not differ in terms of value, Zenner, M., et al., (2008) defends 
the use of both methods to validate assumptions. 
To adjust the discount rate in a cross-border acquisition several risk dimensions must be taken 
into account. The approach followed in this thesis to measure the discount rate is the CAPM as 
already was mentioned, which reflects the non-diversified risk surrounding the investment, as 
well as the tax advantages associated by the use of debt, as well as the equity risk premium 
expected. However, there are others dimensions such as country/industry risk, exchange rate 
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risk, political risk (especially in developing market firms) and liquidity risk (Bodnar, et al., 
2003). 
According with Kester, W. et al., (1995), it is not very consensual how the discount rate should 
be adjusted, since adding additional risk premium in the discount rate can introduce errors into 
the analysis. Also, according to the same author, the assumptions must be very clear about what 
type of non-diversifiable risks the cross-borders’ beta are not correctly capturing and then 
adding a premium to the discount rate. 
Beta’s choice must account to how much the acquirer’s stockholders are exposed in the markets, 
if they are global fully-diversified investors or local investors more vulnerable to a specific 
market. 
Kraft Foods is an American firm and Cadbury is an English firm. To merge both cash-flows in 
the valuation process it was followed Method A. 
7. Types of Acquisitions 
In the literature, Mergers and Acquisitions’ (M&A) terminology can be quite confusing, since 
many research terms, such as “merger”, “acquisition” and “takeover”, can be used 
interchangeably due to the meanings’ similarity between them (Ghauri& Buckley, 2003; 
Cartwright & Schoenberg, 2006; Brealy, Myers & Marcus, 2001;  Sugiarto, 2000).
Defined as a set of different transactions, acquisitions can be categorized based upon the 
acquirer’s nature and what happens to the acquired firm (target firm) after the acquisition 
process (Damodaran, 2002).
There are four different recognized possibilities for a firm to be acquired by another firm: a 
merger, a consolidation, a tender offer and an acquisition of assets. 
A merger is usually a friendly deal and enjoys the cooperation of firms 7(Loughran&Vijh, 
1997). It represents the combination of two firms into one where the acquiring firm assumes all 
assets and liabilities of the bidding firm that ceases to exist, since it becomes part of the 
acquiring firm, and its preceding shareholders receive cash and/or securities in the acquiring 
firm.  In a consolidation, the process is similar, except it results in a new firm composed by 
both acquiring and acquired firms, each one with a percentage of the ownership (Damodaran, 
2002).
                                                  
7 For the merger to happen both parts must agree, at least 50% of the shareholders of the acquiring and the target firm (Damodaran, 
2002).
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A tender offer occurs when the acquiring firm commits itself publicly to buy the outstanding 
stock of the target firm at a specific price. The target firm tends to exist as long as there are 
minorities of stockholders who refuse the tender. Usually, tender offers can turn into a hostile 
takeover or into a merger (Damodaran, 2002).
The last possibility is one firm acquiring the assets of another firm, as a formal investment, 
and the firm whose assets were purchased continues in activity. 
Another form of acquisition is when the firm is acquired by its own management –
management buyouts – or by outside investors – leveraged buyouts, through a tender offer. 
After this transaction, the acquired firm can cease to exist as a publicly traded firm and become 
a private firm (Damodaran, 2002). 
Traditionally, there are three categories of mergers (Buckley & Ghauri, 2003):
 Horizontal – between firms in the same industry;
 Vertical – between firms in the value chain linkage; 
 Conglomerate – between firms in unrelated business.
7.1. What is behind M&A’s Process?
There are much of literature that justify that the fundamental reasons for the existence of M&A’s 
processes is the argument that they will create synergy. 
Synergy is the additional value that is generated by combining two firms, creating opportunities that 
would not been available to these firms operating independently (Damodaran, 2005). Nevertheless, 
during the process of evaluating the synergies it is important to highlight the concept value of control 
that should not be confused with synergy. The value of control is the incremental value that an 
acquirer believes can be created by running a target firm more efficiently (Damodaran, 2005). The 
incremental value is created by the target itself and not by the combination with another firm. 
Accordingly with Damodaran (2005), synergies must be influenced by one of four inputs into the 
valuation process: higher cash flows from existing assets, higher expected growth rates, a longer 
growth period or a lower cost of capital. 
There are two considered sources of synergies: operating synergies and financial synergies. 
Operating synergies (Increasing Revenues / Decreasing Costs) allows firms to increase their 
operating income from existing assets, mainly through economies of scale (enabling the combined 
firms to be more cost-efficient and profitable), economies of scope (functional strengths that can be 
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transferable across businesses), greater price power and higher growth in markets that can lead to 
higher margins and growth rates. 
Financial synergies (higher cash flows / lower cost of capital) are possible when the combined firms 
have different opportunities available, such as a firm with cash slack and with limited projects
opportunities and a firm with higher-return project but no cash available. Another possibility is when 
debt capacity increases8, since the combined firms become more stable and predictable, reducing 
default risk, due to less variable cash flows, what allows them to borrowing more. There are several
financial synergies derived from tax benefits, cash flows can increase due to higher tax deductions that 
sheltered income, also the acquirer can take advantage of tax laws to write up the Target Company’s 
asset, resulting in higher tax savings from depreciation. There are other financial synergies although 
mentioned as dubious in the literature, such as diversification and accretive acquisitions. A 
diversification strategy is known by providing the lowest exposure to risk for any given level of 
expected return through the acquisitions of imperfect correlated assets9. However it seems difficult to 
prove value creation relates directly to M&A’s10, since the market reacts negatively to the 
announcement of diversifying acquisitions (Damodaran, 2002) and because diversifying could result 
in a reverse synergy due to the lack of expertise related to the business. 
To evaluate synergies is used a DCF framework that follows the same procedures, first analyzing the 
companies separately (Status Quo Valuation) and afterwards analyzing both firms together with no 
synergy and with synergy, with the difference between those last two showing the synergy value. 
Based on assumptions and forecasts, synergies are difficult to measure not just in value but in 
time. It is not just relevant to know how much is the synergy value but also when they will start 
affecting cash flows; the longer it takes to show up, the less it values.
So to avoid a “synergy trap”, this means, to pay a high premium for a firm that will not create the 
expected synergy, Sirower&Sahni (2006) suggests an “earnings” model for the target that through a 
combination of cost reductions and revenue enhancements would justify a given premium that can be 
used as a benchmark for any deals.  
The author defines that one unit of the target’s offer premium is the product of the premium (%P) and 
equity market value of the target firm, meaning in order to earn one unit of premium offered of the 
target, the target’s after-tax earnings (  ) must increase by %P. 
% 	 ×    = % 	 × (  ×  ) × (1 −  )
                                                  
8This argument assumes that both the acquiring firm and the target were at their optimal debt capacities prior to the merger. The 
merger reduces the overall risk in the combined firm and increased the optimal debt capacity (Damodaran, 2002).
9Bodie, Z., Kane, A., and Marcus, A.J. (2008) Essentials of Investments (7th edition), Boston: McGraw-Hill Irwin.
10Bruner, R.F. (2004) “Where M&A Pays and Where It Strays: A Survey of the Research”, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 
16(4), pp. 63-76.
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Where R is the revenue,   the pretax profit margin and T the affective tax rate.
This represents that for each percentile unit of offering premium over the target’s pre-announcement 
market value, the target must generate the same percentile unit increase in pretax profit margin.
This increase must be delivered by pre-tax synergies, which can be created not only by revenue 
enhancement but by cost reduction as well. 
%	     = 	
% 	 × ( 	 ×  )
  × (1 −  )
After achieving the pre-tax synergies, Sirower&Sahni (2006) also suggests to plot graphically the 
solutions in a MTP11 line to best analyse the business combination of cost savings and revenues 
enhancements. This graphic is illustrated in section 20.3 of this dissertation where the MTP Line’s 
importance is straightforward: deals below the line should be avoided.
7.2. Is M&A a loser’s game?
Accordingly to Bruner (2004), there is a “conventional wisdom” that M&A is a loser’s game, 
“only about 20% of all mergers really succeed (…)” , an idea also present in Ghauri& Buckley 
(2003). 
Wealth gains in M&A trigger some disagreement between researchers, in part due to differences 
in how returns are computed what generates incomparable results and a lack of feasible metrics 
to analyse the value creation in M&A. Also, some of those studies are focused on accounting 
measures, such as net income, ROE, ROA and EPS, leverage and liquidity and are structured to 
matched-sample comparisons in which acquirers’ performance are set against peers (non-
acquirers) of similar size, in the same industry (Bruner, 2004). 
Ghauri& Buckley (2003), defend that the assumption of profitability in a M&A is erroneous, 
based on the argument that if the market price fully reflects the future profit stream of the 
acquired assets, then there is no scope for profit from acquisitions. 
However, accordingly with Loughran&Vijh (1997), there are three patterns established in the 
literature: 
 Target shareholders earn significantly positive abnormal returns from all acquisitions;
 Acquiring shareholders earn little or no abnormal returns from tender offers;
 Acquiring shareholders earn negative abnormal returns from mergers.
                                                  
11Meet the Premium
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Nevertheless, the authors conclude that the target shareholders that hold on to the acquirers’ 
stock received as payment find their gains diluted over time. As already was mentioned, there is 
a relationship between post-acquisition returns of acquirer’s stock and the mode of acquisition, 
as well as the form of payment (Loughran&Vijh, 1997):
 On average, the acquirers earn less excess returns from mergers than from tender offers;
 On average, stock acquirers earn less excess returns than cash acquirers;
 On average, stock mergers earns significantly negative returns;
 On average, Cash tender offers earn significantly positive returns. 
Although Sirower&Sahni (2006) show results that meet the patterns mentioned above, it states 
that the stock market reacts negatively to a M&A announcement, which reflects the investors’ 
skepticism about the ability of the acquirer to maintain the original values of both firms and also 
the achievement of synergies justifying the premium paid. 
To mitigate part of the skepticism, Sirower&Sahni (2006), created a simple measure to assess 
synergy risk very similar to the VAR concept, where with one number it is possible to show 





M&A clearly pays for the shareholder target and the combined shareholders’ generates positive 
abnormal returns, meaning that there is a value creation in the economy (Bruner, 2004). 
However, it is important to highlight not only the importance of valuation knowledge, but also 
the firms’ strategy and post-merger management ability. 
7.3. Methods of Payment: How to choose? 
It is possible to finance an M&A through cash, stock, a mix of cash and stock, or through an 
“earn out” contract12 (Zenner et al., 2008). However, literature shows that the terms of the 
transaction, such as form of payment, have a significant influence on M&A profitability for the 
buyer (Bruner, 2004). 
                                                  
12 An agreement that commits the acquirer of paying higher payments with the target performs better in the future. 
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According to Travlos (1984), there are three main arguments that explain why each method of 
payment reflects in different valuation effects on the bidding firm’s common stock prices.
The first argument is based on a world of asymmetric information13; the method of payment 
may signal information to the market, assuming that if the acquirer firm possesses information 
about the intrinsic value of their firm, which is not reflected in the pre-acquisition stock price,
they will try to finance the acquisition in the best suitable way for shareholders. Following 
Myers &Majluf (1984), managers will prefer a cash offer if they believe they are undervalued, 
while a common stock exchange offer will be preferred if they believe they are overvalued. 
Therefore, based on the extant literature the returns to the acquirer firm will be always higher in 
cash offers than in common stock exchange offers.14
The second argument is based on the fact that cash and stock offers have different tax 
implications. Due to this difference the acquirer firm must pay a higher value in case of a cash 
offer than in case of a stock offer, in part due to the additional tax.  Since cash offers generate 
tax obligations for the target firms’ stockholders but allow the acquiring firm to raise the 
depreciation basis of acquired assets to their market value, common stock offers are, in general, 
tax-free acquisitions, so that any capital gains realized by the target firms’ stockholder are 
deferred until the stock is sold, but the depreciation basis of the acquired assets remains the 
same (Travlos, 1987). 
The last argument is related to the debt capacity, as mentioned earlier the combined firms can 
have less variable cash flows, reducing default risk, increasing the debt capacity. The benefit 
from increasing debt capacity accrues to the merging firms’ bondholders at the stockholders’ 
expense. Thus, a common stock exchange offer leads to a wealth transfer from stockholders to 
bondholders, implying a fall in the stock price. 
8. Cross-Border Trends
Cross-border has expanded as developed-market firms searched for growth opportunities in 
emerging markets and it is considered a common form of investment, in the last decades.  
However, in the last few years, the reverse situation appears to be the new catalyst to new cross-
borders investments - developing-market firms started looking for new markets overseas. This 
new paradigm is hand in hand with financial crises that reduced domestic competition in 
                                                  
13 Assumes that one partner has access to private information that is not known by the other partner.
14Loughran&Vijh (1997); Bruner (2004); Zenner et al. (2008); Travlos (1987)
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developed-market firms and weakened the developed countries currencies, especially U.S. 
dollar. 
Zenner, M. et al., (2008) considered some factors responsible for cross-borders M&A’s growth, 
divided into long-term and short-term drivers. In the long-term drivers, there are three main 
factors: globalization - the soaring necessity to meet growth expectations took firms to seek for 
new markets in foreign countries; diversification– for developed-market firms a way of 
conquer new markets, for developing-market firms a way to reduce the exposure to sovereign 
risk; deregulation – the elimination of some nationalistic and protectionist forces in many 
countries allowed the entering of foreign countries into domestic markets (for example: creation 
of European Union). In the short-term drivers, there are four factors: high relative equity 
valuations – companies tend to be acquirers when their stock prices are high, meaning 
prospects of growth and profits. In the last few years, developing-market firms are benefiting 
from higher equity evaluations comparing with developed-market firms; major currency shifts 
– emerging-market currencies have appreciated in relation to developed-markets currencies, 
which turned developed-market firms more appealing and accessible; sovereign wealth funds –
the main objective of those funds is to generate a future income and not to be exposed to the 
sovereign risk of its own country, so that the income is invested into long-term investments, 
such as acquisitions of illiquid foreign assets; reduced competition – due to the reduced 
liquidity in the debt markets, mainly in developed–markets,  this  made the public firms 
reluctant on investing in a long-term where future is so uncertain; for private firms this scenario 
is even more drastic, since private firms are very dependent on leverage markets. On the other 
hand, developing-market firms have access to more liquidity and leveraged markets, which
increased their acquisition power.
Between the years 2003 – 2006, cross-border acquisitions accounted for less than 30% of all 
total acquisitions and in 2007 that percentage rose to 40%. Also, for a period between 2001 –
2007, acquirers from developing-market firms15 increased by 1.4% and acquirers from the U.S. 
decreased by 2.1% (Zenner, M. et al., 2008).
9. Industry Overview 
This section is divided in four parts. The first part features a Food & Beverage Industry analysis,
focused especially on the Food Packaged Industry, where the Confectionery Industry belongs; 
the second part shows a Kraft Foods’ and Cadbury’s cash flow analysis; the third part is focused 
on the strategies behind Cadbury’s acquisition and, at last, the fourth part portraits the M&A 
activity on Food & Beverage Industry in the last few years. 
                                                  
15Brazil, Russia, India, China and Mexico
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9.1. Food & Beverage Industry 
Food & Beverage (F&B) Industry involves the food industry from farming, food production, 
packaging and distribution, retail and catering; and beverage industry which is composed by soft 
drinks (non-alcoholic), beers, spirits and wines (alcoholic). Thereby, the food’s value chain is 
possible to divide into three categories16: 
 Farming: production and collection of raw agricultural commodities such as rice, 
wheat and corn;
 Processing: transformation of raw food commodities into forms that can be easily 
distributed and sold to consumers; 
 Distribution: finished or near-finished food products are delivered to consumers. 
As a non-cyclical industry, the Food & Beverage Industry presents certain stability during 
economic downturns, due to the fact that food products are essential to life and health of the 
consumers. Looking at Figure 1 despite the decline in consuming spending, the Food & 
Beverage Industry behaves almost uniquely in the economy, which gives this industry a resilient 
character. In Europe, while the manufacturing industry decreased by -7.9% between the first 
quarter of 2008 and the third quarter of 2011, food companies registered a growth of 1.3% 
during the same period. 
Looking at S&P 500 and GTCF Food & Beverage Index17 (Figure 2) this last one always beats
the market, even in bear moments as the downturn in 2008. Once again, the resilient character 
persists. 
                                                  
16 IMAP’s Food & Beverage Industry Global Report 2010
17 Reflects data from food and beverage industry participants that are broadly categorized as food processors, food distributors, food 
retailers and beverage companies
Figure 1 - Food & Beverage Industry Performance 2007-2010
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9.2. Market Growth Trends
Historically, F&B Industry presents a consistent growth wherein 2001-2011 had a CAGR of 
5.2%18. In 2008, global F&B Industry registered revenues of $5.7 trillion and it is expected19 to 
grow at a CAGR (2008-2014) of 3.5% with estimated revenues of more than $7 trillion by 
2014.  According to Goldman Sachs, long-term F&B industry estimates are possible, since it is 
closely tied to income growth.  Hereafter, estimates 20 point for a CAGR (2011-2020) of 6.6% 
driven by a geography mix due to emerging markets exponential growth. Also, it is expected4
that North America market continues to grow at 3%, Western Europe market at 2%, emerging 
markets at 10.8%, especially China (14.4%) and India (21%), Eastern Europe market at 9%, 
LatAm market at 9.3% and Middle East and Africa markets at 10.4%. 
Food industry is responsible for 56% of F&B industry total revenues. In 2008 is expected to 
generate earnings of $3.2 trillion at a CAGR (2008-2013) of 4.6% and revenues are expected to 
increase to $4 trillion by 2013.21
Packaged Food Industry has grew at a CAGR (2001-2008) of 3.1%22 and is expected to grow at 
a CAGR (2010-2015) of 2.8% 23, valuing over $1.8 trillion in 2008. 
Confectionery industry is the fourth largest segment in Package Food with retail sales over $150 
billion, in 2008. Confectionery market is growing steadily at 5% CAGR (2003-2008), where 
60% of total sales by value are coming from developed markets that are growing at 3% CAGR 
(2003-2008), while emerging markets are growing at a 10% CAGR (2003-2008). 
                                                  
18 Goldman Sachs Investment research, October 23, 2012
19 IMAP’s  Food & Beverage Industry Global Report 2010
20 Goldman Sachs Investment research, October 23, 2012
21 IMAP’s Food & Beverage Industry Global Report 2010
22 Euromonitor International
23
Rexam – consumer packaging report 2011/2012
Figure 2 - GTCF Index Vs S&P 500 (2006-2011)
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9.3. Market Drivers
Food industry is highly competitive; players not only compete on price, but also in quality, 
innovation, brand recognition and loyalty, where the top-10 firms have a market share of 15% 
of total sales. Costumers have a lot of bargaining power, due to the quantity of products and 
substitutes in the market, whereas firms must reduce prices to maintain its market share and to 
answer to competitors and, at the same time, costumer’s preferences. 
Food industry is highly correlated with population growth and with consumer spending. 
Developed countries are expected to stay stagnant, with North America’s population expecting 
to grow by 0.8% and Western Europe by 0.3%24 in the next years, while developing countries 
are expected to grow. By 2050, global population is projected to be 9 billion25, with developing 
countries accounting for 85% of participation. To feed the additional 2 billion people it is 
necessary that global food production increases by 70%. Also, in developed countries consumer 
preferences are expected to shift toward high quality and nutritional products, due to a more 
health consciousness. Moreover, due to the declining in consumer spending in developed 
countries pre-packed and home-cook foods products are going to be more appealing. This 
shifting in consumer preferences allows firms penetration into new niches as diet food, where in 
Europe is expected to grow at a CAGR of 3.4% (2008-2014) and in US of 4.1%, organic food 
and frozen food, with an expected CAGR of 3.1% by 2013.  On the other hand, developing 
countries are facing a rising in income levels, which allows the population to acquire more and 
better product. For firms in food industry this represents an opportunity to gain market share and 
increase profits by flooding emerging markets with different products. It is forecasted that over 
the next decade the middle class consumers will double, with over 80% of the increase coming 
from emerging markets. 26
In developed countries due to the declining in consumer spending, most of the retailers started 
internally manufacturing products marked as their house brands, which are less expensive. 
Initially considered low-quality products, private label products improved their quality driving 
a shift in consumer decision-making, competing against large multinational brands. The graphic 
shows private label share market in Western Europe in many food categories. 
                                                  
24 Goldman Sachs Investment research , October 23, 2012
25 IMAP’s Food & Beverage Industry Global Report 2010
26 Goldman Sachs Investment research, January 25, 2012
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As it is possible to observe, in Western Europe, the Private Label share in Prepared Dishes is 
almost 45%. In Biscuit and Cheese is around 25%. Less than 20% are Cooking Sauces and 
Sugar confectionery. The least affected seem to be the chocolate confectionery with only less 
than 10% of Private Label.
However, this industry is highly vulnerable to commodities prices27, as raw materials affect 
the firm’s stable profit growth. 
Commodities prices are extremely volatile due to global competition for resources, currency 
fluctuation, weather conditions and consumer demand. Political concerns can also influence 
commodities prices, such as sovereign risk and agriculture programs. In the middle of 2008, 
prices rose drastically due to severe weather conditions, a strong supply necessity and a weaker 
demand (especially from emerging markets). Since 2006, commodities prices are climbing,
increasing the raw materials’ input costs of food industry’s firms. Also, higher oil prices 
                                                  
27 Dairy, coffee, cocoa, wheat, corn products, soybean, vegetable oils, nuts, meat products and sugar.
Figure 3 - Private Label in Western Europe
Figure 4 - Commodities' Performance 2005-2011
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increase the transportation costs making the distribution and supply of food products more 
expensive than usual. These results in a decrease of profit margin for F&B industry firms, since 
firms are forced to reduce prices and at the same time face higher input, distribution and supply 
costs.  Also, F&B industry firms are not only susceptible to commodities prices but also to 
plastic, glass and cardboard prices. 
At last, innovation is the key factor for success in the Food & Beverage Industry, as a way of 
conquering higher market share and profits maximization. To be able to do that, firms must
answer to consumer’s preferences - that are dictated by demands shifts affected by economic
changes in consumers’ lifestyle - by investing in Research & Development, Marketing and 
Distribution channels.
9.4. Food & Beverage Market Share 
Food & Beverage is a very competitive industry where the top ten packaged food firms only 
account for 15% of market share of total revenues, where each firm contributes fewer than 
3.3%. In 2009, Nestlé, S.A. headed the F&B Industry with a market share of 3.2 %, followed by 
Kraft Foods Inc, the world’s second largest firm with 2.5%. Cadbury had a small market share 
of 1%. 
Cadbury’s acquisition by Kraft Foods (Figure 6) will change the overall package food firm 
competitive landscape. Kraft Foods Inc will take the leading position with a market share of 
3.5% of total revenues and the gap between competitors will be more widespread. However, to 
maintain the leading position, Kraft must increase its growth to distance itself from Nestlé, since 
Kraft will absorb Cadbury’s growth. Firms with lower market share, such as Lactalis Groupe 
Figure 5 - Top 10 F&B Industry Market Share 2008 %
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and Mars will probably conquer better market share, since they have a higher growth 
performance, due to aggressive acquisition strategies.
9.5. Confectionery Industry Market Share
Confectionery Industry is very fragmented (Figure 7), in which the top 5 confectionery industry 
firms have a market share of 42%, in 2009. The largest confectionery firm is Mars-Wrigley with 
a market share of 14.8% and the second largest is Cadbury with a market share of 10.3%.  After 
Cadbury’s acquisition, Kraft Foods will dispute the leadership position with Mars-Wrigley.







Figure 6 - Kraft Foods and Cadbury's Market Share 2001-2008
Figure 7 - Market Share 2009
Source: Euromonitor 
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9.6. Confectionery Market Share by Consumer Segment 
Cadbury is the fourth largest chocolate confectionery firm in the world with a market share of 
7.5%. Kraft Foods appears in third place with a market share of 8.3%, in 2008. (Appendix 1)
In Gum confectionery, Cadbury appears as the second largest firm with a market share of 
28.9%. Mars-Wrigley is leading this segment with a market share of 34.9%. In Candy 
confectionery, Cadbury is leading the market with a market share of 7.2%. Mars-Wrigley
appears in third with a market share of 4.9%. (Appendix 2; Appendix 3; Appendix 4)
Confectionery market is quite fragmented where the top 5 confectionery firms have 42% of total 
market share.  
As it is possible to observe (Figure 8 and 9), chocolate represents the biggest segment with 55% 
share in retail sales and has been growing at 6% CAGR (2003-2008) whereas the top 5 firms 
account with 50% of global confectionery sales, followed by Candy which is considered the 
most fragmented segment with 31% of total confectionery sales and growing at a CAGR (2003-
2008) of 4%. The top 5 players only account with 25% of global confectionery sales in candy.  
Gum is the faster and most consolidated segment growing at 7% CAGR (2003-2008), 
accounting for 14% of total market share, where the two stronger players (Cadbury and 
Wringley) account with 60% of the global market. In emerging markets the growth rates are 
higher with chocolate growing at a CAGR (2003-2008) of more than 12%, gum at 9% and 
candy at 6%.  The overall confectionery market is increasing at 5%. 
Source: Cadbury Annual Report 2008
Figure 8- Global Confectionery Market
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9.7. Food & Beverage Industry Costs
The main costs that affect this industry are related to energy (natural gas), raw materials 
(commodities price), manufacturing costs (especially labor), transportation (oil prices) and a 
complex and growing customer demand based on brand loyalty and quality product expectations 
that need constant improvement in the value chain, especially in innovation, marketing and 
distribution channels. 
9.8. Food & Beverage Industry M&A Activity 
In 2009, M&A activity in Food & Beverage industry suffered a decline due to the economy 
downturn. Comparing with the previous year, the industry saw a decrease in 73.1% in 
transaction value and also a 37% decline in the number of transactions28 . In 2011 was registered 
a weight improve of 13% in the number of transactions comparing with 2010; however the 
aggregate value appears to decline.  In the U.S. it is possible to analyse that scenario, as the 
country where most deals were made each year; it is possible to observe a retraction not only in 
the number of transactions occurred, but also in the value of those transactions since 2005. In 
the period of 2008-2009 it is noticeable the decline in the value of transactions, as well as in the 
number of transactions. By 2010 and 2011, the number of transactions increased, however the 
value stayed as low as in 2007. The period of 2008-2011 was  less competitive in terms of 
acquisitions, due to the lack of liquidity in the economy, where only private equity groups with 
strong balance sheets and financial slack had the opportunity to take advantage of undervalued 
firms to strengthen their competitive positions, as well as improving their value chain with 
vertical acquisitions. 
                                                  
28 IMAP –Food and Beverage Industry Global Report - 2010
Figure 9 - Market Growth Rate (2003-2008)
Sara de Paula Ribeiro                       The Case of Kraft Foods and Cadbury                   38
10. About Kraft Foods, Inc
10.1. General 
Kraft Foods is an American public firm, listed on NASDQ (NASDAQ: KTF), operating on the
Food & Beverage Industry. In 2009, Kraft Foods was the world’s second largest food products 
manufacturer and packager firm with operations in more than 70 countries, 97.000 employees 
worldwide and selling for almost 160 countries. Its products are dispersed into five consumer 
sectors:
 Snacks: primarily biscuits, salted snacks and chocolate confectionery;
 Beverages: primarily coffee, packaged juice drinks and powdered beverages;
 Cheese: primarily natural, processed and cream cheese;
 Grocery: primarily spoonable and pourable dressings, condiments and desserts;
 Convenient Meals: primarily processed meals, frozen pizza, packaged dinners and 
lunch combinations. 
Kraft Foods is geographically segmented in North America, Canada, Europe and Developing 
Countries, such as Brazil, Russia, China and other regions of Southeast Asia.  Kraft Foods
started focusing on emerging markets as a strategy to grow its operations, market share and 
profitability, since emerging markets face growing population and rising income levels followed 
by a shift in demand for more expensive products.   
Figure 10 - F&B Industry M&A Transactions 2005-2011
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In 2009, Kraft Foods presented Net Revenues of $ 40.39 billion, 3.6% less than the previous 
year, an Operating Income of $5.52 billion, 43.7% more than in 2008 and Net Earnings of $3.03
billion, 4.7% more compared with the previous year. 
10.2. History 
Although Kraft Foods, Inc was rebranded in 1995, its foundations go back more than a century 
of history. Kraft Food, Inc was born from the merger of three completely different firms: Kraft, 
General Foods and Oscar Mayer. Kraft started in 1903 and was in the cheese business. General 
Foods, started in 1895 under the name of PostCereal Company in the cereals business, 
responsible for one of the first ready-to-eat cold cereals, as well as corn flakes products. In 
1981, with the intention of entering in a new completely different product category General 
Foods acquired Oscar Mayer & Co, founded in 1883 and a leader in the processed meats. Later, 
General Foods were acquired by Philip Morris Company, Inc that previously had acquired 
Kraft, Inc as a subsidiary too. In 1989, the two subsidiaries, General Foods and Kraft, were 
combined and formed a wholly owned subsidiary Kraft General Foods and, in 1995, was 
rebranded to Kraft Foods, Inc.  In 2001, Philip Morris Company, Inc did a initial public offer to 
Kraft Foods, Inc. In 2007, Altria Group, Inc (new Philip Morris Company, Inc name) completed 
the separation by spinning off its remaining interest in Kraft Foods, Inc.. 
Due to Cadbury’s integration Kraft Foods suffered a transformation in terms of geographic 
market coverage, so in October of 2012, Kraft Foods Inc was split into Kraft Foods Group, 
responsible for North America Grocery Business, and Mondelez International, Inc, responsible 
for global business in emerging markets.  
10.3. Performance 
This performance comparison of 5 years shows that Kraft Foods seems to be underperforming 
comparing with S&P 500 and a peer group. The peer group has a great performance beating the 
market after 2004. The peer group is composed by Cadbury plc, Campbell Soup Company, The 
Clorox Company, The Coca-Cola Company, Colgate-Palmolive Company, ConAgra Foods, 
Diageo plc, General Mills, Inc, Danone, H.J. Heinz Company, Hershey Foods Corporation, 
Kellogg Company, Nestlé S.A., PepsiCo Inc, The Procter & Gamble Company, Sara Lee 
Corporation and Unilever N.V. and reflects all Kraft Foods consumer sectors. 
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10.4. Net Revenues 
With a market share of 2.5% of total revenues in Food & Beverage Industry, in 2009, Kraft 
Foods had net revenues of $40. 38 billion, less 3.7% compared with the $ 41.93 billion had in 
2008, and a CAGR (2005-2009) of 5.28 %. The decrease in net revenues is explained by 
volume decline in almost every segment, expect U.S. Beverage and U.S. Convenient Meals, 
influence by the discontinuation of less profitable product line, as a strategy of walking away 
from unprofitable volumes. Unfavorable foreign currency also decreases net revenues by 
$1.897 million, due to the strength of the U.S. dollar against foreign currencies29.  The decline is 
also explained by the weakening consumption trends, mainly in developed countries. 
                                                  
29
Euro, Russian Ruble, Canadian dollar, Ukrainian hryvnia, British pound, Brazilian and Polish zloty.   
Figure 11 - Kraft Foods Performance 2004-2009
Figure 12 - Kraft Foods Net Revenues
Source: Kraft Annual Report 2009 
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10.5. Net Revenues by Consumer Segment 
In consumer segment Snacks is the largest segment in 2007-2009 period. In 2009, Snacks 
weighted about 37% of total net revenues, followed by beverages with 20%. The smaller 
segment in the period is Grocery weighting 10% of total net revenue. 
Excepting Grocery, from 2007 to 2008, all sectors have grown, especially Snacks with a growth 
rate of 44.5%, followed by Cheese with 11.3%. Grocery decreased by 16.1% in the same period. 
From 2008-2009, excepting Convenience Meals, every sector had decreased, such as Cheese by 
8.6% and Snacks by 5%. Convenient Meals increased by 5.6%. The CAGR (2007-2009) for all 
sectors are 11.2%, 1.2%, 0.6%, -6.2% and 5.2%, respectively.
10.6. Net Revenues by Geographic Segment 
North America is the largest market of Kraft Foods, responsible for 58.6% of total net revenues, 
in 2009, followed by Europe (21.7%) and Emerging Markets (19.7%).  Despite the fact that 
U.S. market is the most important one is, at the same time, the one with smaller growth. CAGR 
(2007-2009) are 1.4%, 6.9% and 24.1%, respectively. It is possible to analyse the importance of 
U.S. as a stable and mature market; however developing markets are the key factor to net 
revenues’ increment.
Source: Kraft Annual Report 2009 
Figure 13 - Net Revenues by Consumer Segment
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10.7. Net Revenues by Consumer & Geographic Segment 
In North America the largest  consumer segment are Snacks, Cheese and Conveninet Meals. In 
Europe and Developing Markets consumer segments in total net revenues are very similar. It is 
notable that the largest consumer segments are Snacks, Beverages and Cheese where 
Convenient Meals appears as the smaller consumer segment. 
Source: Kraft Annual Report 
Source: Kraft Annual Report 2009 
Figure 14 - Net Revenues by Geographic Segment
Figure 15 - Net Revenues by Consumer and Geographic Segment
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10.8. Products
These products are the ones that who’s sales represent 10% or more of total net revenues. The 
products that most contributes for revenues’ growth are biscuits with a CAGR (2007-2009) of 
27.7%, followed by confectionery and cheese with 1.2% and 0.7%, respectively. 
10.9. Organic Net Revenues 
Net revenues include the impact of acquisitions, divestitures and foreign currency fluctuations, 
what camouflages the real value created by the ongoing activities.  To better understand and 
evaluate the firm’s real performance, as well as to make operational and strategic decisions, 
organic net revenues better reflect business’ performance. Despite the decrease in net revenues, 
in 2009, organic net revenues present a continuous growth with a CAGR (2007-2009) of 9.1%. 
Organic Net Revenues exceeded Net Revenues, in 2009, due to high costs with unfavorable 
foreign currency. 
Source: Kraft Annual Report 2009 
Figure 16 - Net Revenues by Product
Figure 17 - Organic Net Revenues
Source: Kraft Annual Report 2009 
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10.10. Operating Income
Kraft Foods presents in 2009 an operating income (Figure 18) of $5.5 billion, more 43.7% than 
2008. This largely improvement is due to cost of sales and exit costs reduction following the 
Restructuring Program started in 2008. In geographic segment, (Figure 19) North America has 
the major stake of operating income in 2007-2009. In 2009, North America operating income 
has a weight 66.1% in total operating with a CAGR (2007-2009) of 10.8%.  Europe and 
Developing Markets has CAGR of 31% and 26.1%, respectively. In consumer segment (Figure 
20), the sectors that most contribute for operating income in US Kraft Foods were Convenient 
Meals, Grocery and Snacks, with a CAGR of 26.3%, 17.1% and 21.4%, respectively. 
Source: Kraft Annual Report 2009 
Figure 18 - Operating Income
Figure 19 - Operating Income by Geographic Segment
Source: Kraft Annual Report 2009 
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10.11. Capital Expenditures (CAPEX)
Funded with cash provided by operating activities, CAPEX was $1.3 billion in 2009, minus 
$0.1 billion over the previous year. With a CAGR of 3.2% , since 2005, CAPEX is mainly used 
in the modernization process of manufacturing facilities that Kraft Food holds around the 
world30 , also is used to support new products and productivity initiatives. Observing CAPEX
allocation by geographic segment in 2009, North America receives the largest share of CAPEX, 
almost 50% ($625 million) of total CAPEX, followed by Developing Markets using 24% ($319 
million), Europe retaining 22% ($292 million) and at last Canada using only 7% ($94 million). 
In 2008, CAPEX was $1.37 billion, more 3% than 2009 and more 9.8% than 2007 ($1.24 
billion).
                                                  
30 In 2009, Kraft Foods, Inc had 159 manufacturing and processing facilities worldwide. In North America they had 54 facilities and 
the remaining was dispersed in 44 countries. 
Source: Kraft Annual Report 2009
Source: Kraft Annual Report 2009 
Figure 21 - CAPEX by Geographic Segment
Figure 20 - Operating Income by Consumer Segment
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10.12. Operating Costs 
Operating costs are composed by General& Administrative (G&A), Research & Development 
(R&D) and Marketing costs. Since 2007, G&A increases every year with a CAGR of 11% and 
is responsible for 77% of operating costs, in 2009. Marketing is the second highest cost with a 
CAGR of 6%, remaining stable at 18%, in 2007 and 2008, but increasing 1% in 2009. Also, 
R&D costs increased since 2007, remaining stable in the last two years at 6%, with a CAGR of 
4%.   (Appendix 5)
11. About Cadbury Plc
11.1. General
Cadbury is a British firm and the world’s second largest confectionery firm after Mars –
Wrigley (merged in 2008) by revenue. Operating in more than 60 countries with over 45.000 
employees Cadbury is global in 20 of the worlds’ top 50 confectionery markets. 
Cadbury is divided into three consumer sectors and its largest brands are:
 Chocolate (brand: Dairy Milk);
 Gum (brand: Trident);
 Candy (brand: Halls).
Cadbury is dispersed in many countries especially in emerging markets, such as Argentina, 
Brazil, Egypt, India, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey and Venezuela, with a 
CAGR (2003-2005) of 12% and 11% overall market share. 
In 2009, Cadbury presented revenues of £5.98 billion, 11% more than in the previous years and 
earnings of £510 million, 39% more than the previous year.  
11.2. History
Cadbury was founded in 1824 by John Cadbury and started as a little shop where tea and cocoa 
were sold.  In 1969, merged with Schweppes and become Cadbury Schweppes plc in two 
business streams: beverage and confectionery. In 2003, after acquiring U.S. Adams’ chewing 
gum business, Cadbury Schweppes becomes in the world’s biggest confectionery. However, in 
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2008, Cadbury Schweppes plc segregates its global confectionery operations (renamed Cadbury 
Plc) from its U.S. beverages operations, which was renamed Dr Pepper Snapple Group Inc. This 
segregation process started in 1999 by selling most of its beverage businesses and finished in 
2009 with the sale of Dr Pepper Snapple Group Inc.. The goal of this procedure was to enable 
Cadbury to focus on its core business - confectionery business - to better deliver the 
shareholders’ value, maintaining its leadership position, as well as leveraging its position to 
maximize returns and growth. 
In 2010, Cadbury Plc was acquired by Kraft Foods by $18.9 billion (£11.5 billion) where it was 
incorporated into Kraft Foods’ business operations.  Listed into FTSE 100 index since 1984 
(CBRY:LN) it was de-listed after the takeover.  
All performance indicators presented in this thesis are only about Cadbury, Plc’s business and 
the information displayed is limited to the years 2007 and 2008. 
11.3. Revenues
In 2009, Cadbury had revenues of £5.98 billion, 11% more than in the previous years.  
Revenues have been growing steadily since 2005 with a CAGR (2005-2009) of 8.7%.  This 
growth is due to the Vision into Action (VIA) program, introduced in 2007, that has as goal of 
an annual increase in organic revenues between 4%-6%. In 2008, the organic revenues growth 
on the chocolate segment was 6%, on Gum was 10% and on candy was 6%. On average, 
organic revenues grew about 7%, 1% more than predicted. 
Source: Cadbury Annual Report 2009
Figure 22 – Cadbury’s Net Revenues
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11.4. Revenues by Consumer Segment 
By consumer segment chocolate sales correspond to 46% of total revenues, gum sales to 33% 
and Candy to 21%. (Appendix 6)
11.5. Revenues by Geographic Segmentation
Cadbury is present in more than 60 countries and has leadership positions in more than 20 of the 
world’s top 50 confectionery markets. With a strong presence in emerging markets, such as 
India and Brazil, Cadbury accounts with a CAGR (2003-2008) of 12%. 
Britain and Ireland (B&I) represent 23% (£1.366 m) of total revenues and is one of the biggest 
Cadbury’s operations units. In Britain, chocolate business accounts to 30% of market share, not 
beating the 42% market share in Ireland. Also candy has good positions in both countries with a 
market share of 26% and 37%, respectively. 
Middle East and Africa (M&A31) only represents 8% (£ 454 m) of total revenues, however 
with leading positions in the confectionery market. In South Africa, Cadbury has 27% of market 
share, followed by 38% in Egypt and Nigeria with more than 50% of market share. BIMA holds 
a CAGR (2006-2009) of 6.3%. 
Europe represents one of the biggest slices of 19% (£1.117m) of total revenues with a CAGR 
(2006-2009) of 11.2%.  Cadbury has a significant gum and candy market share in almost all 
                                                  
31 Middle East and Africa
Source: Cadbury Annual Report 2009
Figure 23 – Net Revenues by Geographic Segmentation (%)
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Western Europe, Scandinavia, Turkey and Russia. In Western Europe, France is the biggest 
market where candy and gum market shares account to 43% and 17%, respectively. Turkey is 
the second most important where both candy and gum market share accounts with more them 
50% of market share. For chocolate, Poland represents the best market with 18% of market 
share. 
To North America belong 23% (£ 1.364 m) of total revenues. Considered the world’s largest 
confectionery market32, Cadbury secured 14% of market share for chocolate, 34% of market 
share for gum and 55% of market share for candy. South America accounts for 8% (£ 462 m) 
of total revenue and a 20% market share. In Brazil, the seventh largest confectionery market in 
the world, Cadbury detains 75% of the market share in gum, against 55% in Argentina. Also, in 
Argentina candy holds a market share of 24%. Americas has a CAGR (2006-2009) of 13.5%. 
Asia holds 7% (£ 425 m) of total revenue. India is the biggest operation that Cadbury has in 
Asia, followed by Thailand (59% market share in gum and 22% in candy). China is considered a 
strong potential market where Cadbury is seeking to grow. Pacific is responsible for 13% (£779
m) of total revenues. Australia is one of the most important markets with a market share of 30%, 
New Zealand is a small market where Cadbury is leader with 41% of market share, followed by 
Japan where candy accounts only with 5% of market share. Asia and Pacific are responsible for 
a CAGR (2006-2009) of 14.5%. 
                                                  
32 Cadbury Annual Report 2008
Source: Cadbury Annual Report 2009
Figure 24 - Revenues by Geographic Segment (bn)
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11.6. Operating Costs
The biggest slice of operating costs belongs to Cost of Sales - this involves ingredients, labor, 
utility and depreciation costs – with 60%, (£2.870 million) 12% more than in the previous year 
(£ 2.870 million), followed by Administration Expenses with 21% (£ 1.110million) 1% more 
than in 2008 ( £ 1.098 million). Administration Expenses includes cost of information 
technology, back office functions and Research and Development (R&D) costs. In 2008, R&D 
costs were £69 million 16.9% more than in the previous year (£59 million).  Marketing is 
responsible for 12% of operating costs with £629million 8% more than in the previous year (£ 
584 million). Distribution costs are the smallest slice in operating costs only contributing with 
5% (£ 262 million) 6% more than in 2008 (£ 247 million). (Appendix 7)
11.7. Capital Expenditure 
Capital Expenditure in 2008 and in 2007 was used to invest in production capacity and in 
facilities, particularly in the UK chocolate production and in gum capacity in Europe. From 
2007 to 2008, the use of Capital Expenditure increased by 36.9%, funded by internal earnings. 
12. Emerging Markets
As it was previously analysed emerging markets have a weight of only 20% in Kraft’s total 
revenues and its CAGR (2007-2009) is the highest of Kraft’s geographic segmentation with 
24.1%, where for Cadbury emerging markets provides 34% of total revenues. For Kraft Foods 
to increase its share market and also its profits maximization, it must leverage its position in 
emerging markets. 
Source: Cadbury Annual Report 2009
Figure 25 - CAPEX
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By acquiring Cadbury, Kraft Foods will be able to use Cadbury’s brands and distribution 
networks across many emerging markets increasing not only Cadbury’s market share but, at the 
same time, Kraft Foods’ diverse portfolio brands; not only by penetrating into new markets but 
also in new consumer segments, such as powder concentrates soft drink. 
Kraft Foods is already a global leader in powder concentrates soft drinks with its brand Tang. 
However, it is unable to penetrate in certain emerging markets, such as India, where Cadbury’s 
brands are already well established, with five factories producing confectionery items. The 
figure shows an estimation done by Kraft Foods where is possible to observe the  benefits of 
acquiring Cadbury by entering into new emerging markets, such as Mexico, Turkey, South 
Africa and India. For Cadbury, markets such as Brazil and China have been difficult to gain 
market share and visibility; with this acquisition Cadbury also will benefit by increasing its 
market share on those markets. 
It seems that the access to emerging markets is the key factor for Kraft Foods interest in 
Cadbury, where levering Cadbury’s name enables Kraft Foods to conquer new markets, 
strengthening in other markets where Kraft Foods is already established, while also enabling an
increase in the market share of its own brands and maximizing profits.  
13. Kraft Foods’ Forecasted Cash Flow
Cash flows are going to be forecasted until 2015 and after that period the firm will grow at a 
rate of 2.5%. Inflation after 2015 is forecasted to be 2%33 and U.S. real market growth is 
estimated to be 2.5%, according to the industry growth expectations, 2.5% seems to be more 
accurate. 
                                                  
33 Congress Budget Office – The Bugdet and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2012-2022
Figure 26 - Market Access
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To perform Kraft Foods’ valuation, it is necessary to compute the FCFF and for that it must be 
considered the EBIT34, Depreciation, Capital Expenditure and Working Capital. The 
assumptions behind those drivers are going to be explained in their respective sections. 
13.1. Revenues 
In the Kraft Foods’ annual report, it is possible to observe that the information presented is 
reported in five consumer segments: Snacks, Beverages, Cheese, Grocery and Convenient 
Meals. Each of these consumer segments not only has different growth rates, as it has different 
future growth trends. For that reason, revenues are going to be forecasted individually according 
to each consumer segment. Also, the annual report highlights the importance of the three main 
geographical markets: North America, Europe and Developing Markets. Each market consumer 
segment is expected to have different trends, as well as growth rates. In this way, revenues are 
going to be analysed by geographic market and by its consumer segments.
The most significant consumer segments are snacks and convenient meals. The other consumer 
segments are quite residual. Also, the lack of information about revenues’ estimations makes 
assumptions difficult to analyse. While it is perceived by the report that Kraft Foods is more 
focused on increasing its market share in emerging markets, in some of these markets Kraft 
Foods has difficulties to enter, due to the lack of distribution channels. The assumptions will 
assume a conservative character based on economic perceptions and consumption information. 
(Appendix 8 and 9)
In an overall perspective, Kraft Foods’ revenues are going to grow at a CAGR (2010-2015) of 
2%, according with projections35 of an economy recovery from global financial crisis and 
economy recession, an increasing in household income and a slow population growth in 
developed countries against developing countries, despite the increased competition with private 
labels. At least, the U.S. dollar is expected to depreciate over the next decade benefiting trade 
competition in exportations. 
13.1.1. North America Market
The North American market is responsible for more than 50% of total revenues and is the most 
stable and mature market presenting a continued growth with a CAGR (2010-2015) of 1%. 
                                                  
34 Earnings Before Interest and Taxes
35 USDA Agricultural Projections to 2019
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Although U.S. population is expected36 to decrease by 0.24%, the median household income is 
forecasted to grow (2010-2015) 1.98% and it is assumed a slight recession recovery from 2010. 
Also, retail food prices, as U.S. economy recovers, are expected37 to rise. 
Convenient Meals is the consumer segment that presents the highest and continued growth with 
a CAGR of 2%, because this consumer segment usually tends to increase in economic recession 
periods, since is a more economical way of preparing meals. However, despite recession 
periods, the pace of life in most developed countries is speeding up and householders turn to 
Convenient Meals to save some time and effort.  Snacks is the most mature consumer segment 
with a CAGR (2010-2015) of 1.6%, although suffering a downturn in 2009, since snacks are 
considered superfluous products, they are expected to register a continued increase allied to a 
slight economy recovery and an increase of a healthiest conscience that looks for healthy or low 
fat snacks. Following Snacks are Grocery, Beverages and Cheese with a CAGR (2010-2015) of 
0.5%, 0.3% and -0.1%, respectively.  Grocery and Cheese are segments that tend to increase 
with the increase of Convenient Meals and household income. 
13.1.2. European Market
The European market is responsible for 20% of total revenues and despite being a conquered 
market it has the potential to gain more market share in total revenues. It is expected38 that by 
2015, the European population will decrease by 0.11% and the household income will increase 
by less than 1.9%39. 
In 2009, every consumer segment decreased in revenues and due to the persistence of economic 
recession, this scenario is forecasted also for 2010. In 2011, it is possible to observe a slight 
growth in all consumer segments what turns to be more significant from 2013 ahead assuming a 
slight economic recovery. 
In the European Market the most significant consumer segments in terms of total revenues are 
Snacks and Beverages. Similar to the North American Market, and for the same reasons, 
Convenient Meals and Snacks are the fastest growing consumer segments both with a CAGR 
(2010-2015) of 2.6% .Grocery and Cheese also faced an increase associated with the
Convenient Meals consume. European Market’s total revenues will grow at a CAGR (2010-
2015) of 1.4%, less than the realized period with a CAGR (2007-2009) of 11.9%. 
                                                  
36 Esri forecasts for 2010 and 2015.
37 USDA Agricultural Projections to 2019.
38 OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2006-2015
39 USDA Agricultural Projections to 2019
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13.1.3. Developing Markets
With the same weight in total revenues as the European Market, Developing Markets are the 
market with higher growth capacity with a CAGR (2010-2015) of 4.6%, representing Kraft 
Foods’ solution to increase its market share in total revenues. Population growth in developing
countries, in opposition to developed countries, is galloping. By 2050 is expected40 that the 
global population increases from 6.8 billion (data from 2010) to 9 billion, where developing 
countries are accounted with 85% of it. Income level is expected41 to grow 7% in developing 
countries, after the global economic recession, against 2% in developed countries. This rise in 
income level shifts the demand for different products, such as meat and dairy products. In this 
stage, developing markets are looking for products’ diversification, instead of products’ 
differentiation. 
It is important to highlight that the increase in income levels and the demand for new and 
imported products are not the only drivers for revenues growth in developing markets, the lower 
competition level, mainly in terms of private label, constitutes another driver. The consumer 
segment with the most significant improvement was assumed to be Snacks with a CAGR (2010-
2015) of 5.1%, due to the rise of income level those products are considered less superfluous. 
After Snacks, but with a smaller impact in total revenues, is Convenient Meals with a CAGR 
(2010-2015) of 8.8%, followed by Beverages, Grocery and Cheese with a CAGR (2010-2015) 
of 5.5%, 2.6% and 1%, respectively. 
13.2. EBITDA
Even though Revenues were analysed by being divided into geographic and consumer 
segments, due to the lack of information EBITDA and EBITDA Margin are going to be 
analysed by their total consolidated value. 
During the realized period Cost of Sales margin was reduced from 66% and 67%, in 2007 and 
2008, respectively, to similar values of 2005 at 64% in 2009. Since commodities are expected42
to increase in 2010 and then remain stable, Cost of Sales will increase to 65% and be stable 
during the forecasted period. Also, the Restructuring Plan put into action during the period of 
2007 and 2009 by Kraft Foods, allowed a reduction in Cost of Sales since it makes production 
capacity more efficient.  
                                                  
40 IMAP –Food and Beverage Industry Global Report - 2010
41 IMAP –Food and Beverage Industry Global Report - 2010
42 USDA Agricultural Projections to 2019
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Operating costs are going to increase by a CAGR (2010-2015) of 3%, due to Kraft Foods’ need
of investing more in advertisement, mainly in developing markets, as well as in R&D, to 
develop new products and flavors to enlarge its range of products to stay ahead the of 
competition by satisfying the most demanding needs on developed markets. Also, G&A costs 
are going to increase due to the necessity of business expansion, mainly in developing markets. 
From 2005 to 2009, EBITDA has been gradually increasing, despite the downturn in Revenues 
in 2009. EBITDA margin has not been stable in the last five years, decreasing from 14% to 13% 
and 12% in 2007 and 2008, respectively, but recovering to 14% again in 2009. 
For the forecasted period EBITDA will decrease by a CAGR (2010-2015) of -1% and EBITDA 
margin will decrease to 12% and 11% in 2003. This decrease is related to the small increase in 
revenues and the increase in operating costs.
Also, it was considered that the firm is going to have asset impairment and exit costs. To 
forecast this rubric an average of previous values was used and applied in the future. At the 
same, gains/losses on net divestures were also considered in the forecast, since it makes part of 
the firm strategy to buy and sell business activities. To forecast this rubric, an average value 
based on its previous values was considered
In conclusion, EBITDA’s decrease from 2011 to 2015 was due to a small revenues’ increase, 
stabilization in Cost of Sales, due to higher but more stable commodities’ prices and a firms’ 
Restructuring Plan that resulted in a more efficient production capacity.
13.3. Amortization and Depreciation 
There is no information in Kraft Food’s report that makes it possible to get a percentage of 
amortization to forecast depreciations. However, looking at the past value, it is possible to 
observe a pattern in previous tangible assets amortizations. Following that pattern, amortization 
is going to be forecasted as 7.8% of total tangible assets. 
It is said in the report that is forecasted that the intangible assets’ amortization is going to be of 
$15 million dollars for the next years.
This way of computing depreciation does not take into account capital expenditure. So it 
assumes that capital expenditure takes place randomly during the year.
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13.4. Capital Expenditure 
Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) is important in this industry to modernize facilities and support 
initiatives in developing new products or to create a more efficient productivity. From 2005 to 
2009, CAPEX has growing at a CAGR of 3% and according to Kraft Foods’ report, it is 
expected that 2010 CAPEX values stay in line with the past year. It was already mentioned that 
Kraft Foods is planning to increase product’s innovation, as well as expand business mainly in 
developing markets and for that is necessary to improve the production capacity. According to 
this information, and since nothing more about CAPEX is mentioned in the report, it was 
assumed that the CAPEX in 2010-2015 will continue to grow at a CAGR of 3%.  
13.5. Net Working Capital 
Working Capital is a measure of operating liquidity, meaning Kraft Foods’ efficiency and health 
in a short-term period. Since in the Kraft Foods’ report there was no information about Working 
Capital computation, was computed by the following formula: 
       	        =           +            	        −         	        	
To compute the Working Capital some information from Kraft Food’s Balance was considered. 
A positive working capital means that the company is able to support all its short-term 
commitments, while a negative working capital means that the company failed with its short-
term commitments. (Appendix 10)
To forecast the inventory, the past inventory turnover ratio was analysed, which is found by 
dividing the inventory by the total revenues. It the last years, inventory turnover ratio stabilized 
into 9% and it was assumed to remain like that in the future.  Receivables account and Payables 
account were forecasted based on their previous growth rates, since it is difficult to analyse any 
trend when divided by COGS43. Although this is not the best way to forecast these rubrics, no 
other information was available to make assumptions. 
Analysing the Receivables and Payables turnover it is possible to analyse that on average, from 
2005 to 2009, Kraft Foods takes 44 days to receive from its clients and 32 days to pay to its 
suppliers, meaning that Kraft Foods pays first than receives. 
In conclusion, Net Working Capital is very important to compute cash-flows. A negative net 
working capital (more current liabilities than current assets) represents free cash in the firm.  
Any variation in Net Working Capital will directly affect Enterprise Value.
                                                  
43 Cost of Goods Sold
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13.6. Average Weighted Cost of Capital (WACC)
According to the literature, to compute the Enterprise Value through the FCFF44 approach it is 
needed to discount at WACC rate. To compute the WACC it is necessary to follow CAPM 
formulas to compute the cost of equity (Appendix 11).






× (1 −   )
   =    +   (   −   )
According to Damodaran’s Website, equity risk premium (   −   )for the U.S. market is 4.5% 
(Aaa Moody’s rating) with a default probability of 0 basis point, meaning that it is assumed that 
the total equity risk-premium is 4.5%. 
To estimate a firm’s beta is better to use an industry-derived unlevered beta and re-levered 
according to firm’s capital structure, instead of using an industry-derived levered beta45. 




According to Damodaran’s Website, a global unlevered beta for Food Processing Industry is 
0.54 and the re-levered beta is 0.74. To compute a risk-free rate, according to the literature46, a 
2009 U.S. 10 year Treasury bond of 3.84% is going to be use. Since the U.S Federal statutory 
rate is 35% and the average of Kraft Foods’ effective tax rate from 2005 to 2009 is 29.35%, the 
same corporate tax rate of 31.5% (used by J.P. Morgan47) was assumed to perform 
computations. 
To compute cost of debt, one possibility is to compute the average cost of debt of which debt 
rubric, but that information is not possible to find; or  by looking at the ratio of interest expenses 
by Net Debt, but since the interest rate fluctuates from 3.06% to 7.55% it is also difficult to find 
a trend. Other possibility is to use Kraft Foods’ credit rating, find the probability of default and 
add the risk-free rate. In the report is said that, according to Moody’s, credit rating is Baa2, 
representing a default spread of 2.0% (Damodaran’s Website).  This way, the cost of debt is 
going to be 5.84% (3.84% + 2.0%). 
                                                  
44 Free Cash Flow to the Firm 
45 Copeland, T. et al (2000)
46 Copeland, T. et al (2000)
47 J.P. Morgan Europe Equity Research 18 September 2009
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Finally, it is important to define the Kraft Foods’ capital structure and to highlight the 
importance of this capital structure in market values.  Also Debt should be considered without 
Cash and Cash Equivalents. The target D/E ratio should be of 55%.
In this way it is possible to compute the WACC. Cost of equity levered is 7.19% and the cost of 
equity unlevered – necessary to compute Enterprise Value through APV approach - is 6.27%. 
The Average Weighted cost of capital is 6.05%.
The Enterprise Value (EV) using DFC approach is $ 62.12 billion. (Appendix 12)
13.7. Adjusted Present Value (APV) 
According to the literature, to compute the Enterprise Value using the APV approach requires 
the analysis of the independently unlevered Enterprise Value and then adding the financial side 
effect taking into account costs of financial distress.
To compute unlevered Enterprise Value is needed to discount FCFF at the unlevered cost of 
equity of 6.27%. To analyse the financial side effects, it is necessary to compute the present 
value of interest tax shield (PVITS) and, for that, the assumption of corporate tax rate, the target 
capital structure, Net debt and the cost of debt are needed. 
The last part is composed by costs of financial distress. The default of probability for a company 
with a firm rated Baa2 is 2.00% and the cost of financial distress for this industry is assumed to 
be 50%, meaning that in case of distress Kraft Foods will lose 50% of its total assets. 
Following this approach, the Enterprise Value is $ 66.12 billion. (Appendix 13)
14. Relative Valuation 
To perform a careful analysis it was performed a peer group valuation to understand if the 
valuation estimated by the DFC approach conforms a certain range of comparative firms, since 
the DFC approach can lead to some errors in estimating firms’ value because it is based on 
assumptions. 
According to Goedhart et al. (2005), forward-looking multiples were used and to compute the 
range only enterprise-value multiples were focused.
The peer group was chosen according to the peer group used by Kraft Foods in its 2009 report 
that was mentioned in Kraft Foods, Inc Performance, in the previous section. However, not all 
firms were taken into account because its capital structures, risk and growth were not 
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comparable. Also, some of the chosen firms are quite dubious if they should be considered 
comparable or not, but since Kraft Foods has many different consumer segments it was
necessary to have all of them represented in the peer group. 
The indicators were collected from Bloomberg for the 2010 analysis; however indicators for 
Kraft Foods and Cadbury were taken from its current valuation. There were four different 
multiples computed: Price-to Earnings ratio (P/E), Price to Book ratio (P/B), Enterprise-Value 
to Sales (EV/Sales) and Enterprise-Value to EBITDA (EV/EBITDA) 
The first multiple P/E is considered one of the most important multiples, since it shows the 
investors’ expectations of how much they are willing to pay. Kraft Foods’ P/E is trading at a 
reasonable fair value but the lowest comparing with its peers. Looking at P/B ratio, Kraft Foods 
has a lower ratio compared with its peers, meaning that the stock could be undervalued and no 
growth expectations are taking into account by investors. 
The next multiples are enterprise-value multiples what have the advantage of not being easily 
manipulated as equity multiples are. 
Kraft Foods’ EV/Sales is higher compared with the average peer group probably due to higher 
margins, and EV/EBITDA is higher as well, compared with the average peer group.
To better analyse the peer group, multiples were divided into minimum (min), average and 
maximum (max). As it is possible to observe in the graphics the range given by EV/EBITDA is





P/E P/Book EV/Sales EV/EBITDA
Campbell's Soup US 12,06 15,81 13,03 1,90 10,70
Hershey US 10,7 18,49 11,86 2,06 11,64
Hj Heinz US 14,54 16,23 7,69 1,78 11,65
Kellogg US 20,29 16,52 8,93 1,98 12,41
General Mills US 23,38 15,29 4,33 2,01 11,10
Pepsico US 103,86 15,6 4,92 2,12 11,51
Nestlé SW 190,94 21,06 2,88 2,08 11,72
Coca-Cola US 150,74 18,85 4,86 4,65 16,49
Unilever US 87,51 15,43 4,52 1,64 9,54
Danone FR 38,1 15,42 2,43 2,11 11,23
Colgate-Palmolive US 39,78 16,61 14,87 2,75 11,09
PG US 170,55 16,34 2,85 2,52 10,41
Cadbury UK 12,69 29,26 2,54 3,22 23,85
Average - 67,32 17,76 6,59 2,37 12,56
Bloomberg Multiples -2010
Sara de Paula Ribeiro                       The Case of Kraft Foods and Cadbury                   60
that the Enterprise-Value should be between 47.33 billion and 118.32 billion and using 
EV/Sales, the Enterprise-Value should be between 66.88 billion and 189.63 billion.
In conclusion, it is important to highlight that multiples should give a range or a rough idea of 
what the Enterprise-Value should be and must not be taken as the main valuation process, since 
comparable firms are very difficult to find, because there are no two similar firms - they always 
differ in growth expectations or return on invested capital. Also, the way ratios are computed 
can lead to bias analysis. For example, the P/E ratio is vulnerable to changes in capital structure 
and one ratio does not have all the information necessary to analyse a firm. 
Figure 27 - EV to EBITDA
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As was already mentioned, this peer group can have some limitations. Kraft Foods is not a 
company with only one consumer segment and to perform a complete peer group was used 
firms that have as business activity only one of Kraft Foods’ consumer segment. Their 
dimensions could be different, as well as their margins. 
15. Sensitivity Analysis 
The previous estimations are very conservative, as already was mentioned. To perform a better 
valuation it is important to analyse a possible deviation from the previous assumptions to 
understand the impact in the Enterprise Value. 
Kraft Foods is performing in a high competitive market. Despite the fact of being the worlds’ 
second largest firm its growth expectations are very low comparing with its competitors. It 
should be interesting to observe the variation of a more and less conservative growth 
expectations in the valuation process. 
This sensitivity analysis makes it possible to measure the impact of different assumptions in the 
valuation process. The first sensitivity analysis considers a variations in revenues, cost of sales 
and operating costs, which derived in two different case scenarios: bear case scenario and bull 
case scenario.
The bear case scenario considers revenues 1% lower for each forecasted year, where the cost of 
sales and operating costs are 1% higher for each forecasted year. The opposite scenario, the bull 
case, considers revenues 1% higher for each forecasted year, where the cost of sales and 
operating costs are 1% lower for each forecasted year. (Appendix 14 and 15)
The bear case results in an Enterprise Value by the DFC approach of $ 59.84 billion and a target 
price of $ 29.33, where the bull case shows an Enterprise Value by the DFC approach of $89.15
billion and a target price of $49.10. This shows how much the Enterprise Value is sensible to 
different variations in assumptions, especially in the Bull Case, where the revenues increase by 
1% and COGS and operating costs decrease by 1% each. 
Table  3 - Kraft Foods Scenarios
Bear Case Base Case Bull Case
DCF 59,84 62,12 89,15
Target Price 29,33 30,86 49,10
* In b illions o f Do llar (expect Targ et Price)
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The second sensitivity analysis is related to a variation in WACC and growth rate using the 
Base Case. By using a range of WACC and terminal growth rate, it is possible to see the impact 
on the target price. 
        
Looking at the table is possible to observe that by varying the WACC and the terminal growth 
rate, the target price suffers a variation between $ 26.32 and $35.22. The price-target for Kraft
Foods according to the base case valuation is $ 30.86.
To conclude this sensitivity analysis, it is possible to infer that Kraft Foods may be undervalued;
since its share price of $26.78 at 9th November of 2009 is inferior to the target-price of all cases
scenarios. Also, in the Growth Rate –WACC sensitivity analysis the majority of the price targets 
are set above the share price. 
16. Cadbury’s Forecasted Cash Flow
Cash flows are going to be forecasted until 2015 and after that period Cadbury will grow at 
terminal growth rate of 2.50%, despite real GDP are expected48 to grow at 2.4% and Inflation at 
2%, after 2015. It is believed that this is a quite optimistic growth rate in an instable global 
financial scenario.
The assumptions for Cadbury’s FCFF and reasons behind them are going to be presented in 
their respective sections. (Appendix 16 and 17)
16.1. Revenues 
In Cadbury’s report, revenues are presented in four geographical segments: BIMA49, Europe, 
Americas50 and Pacific-Asia. Each of these geographical segments has different growth rates, as 
well as different future trends, for that reason revenues are going to be presented by 
geographical segment. 
                                                  
48 National Institute of Economic and Social Research 
49 Britain, Ireland, Middle East and Africa 
50 North and South America
Table  4 - Kraft Foods Sensitivity Analysis
2,20% 2,35% 2,50% 2,65% 2,80%
5,90% $29,11 $30,45 $31,90 $33,48 $35,22
6,05% $27,62 $28,84 $30,86 $31,59 $33,16
6,20% $26,32 $27,44 $28,66 $29,97 $31,40
WACC
Growth Rate
P ric e  T a rg e t  
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Due to the lack of information about revenues perspectives the assumptions are going to be 
done according to economic conditions and consumption perceptions, and they are going to 
have a conservative character. 
In an overall perspective, Cadbury’s revenues are going to increase at a CAGR (2010-2015) of 
5%, according to an economy recovery after 2012 for Europe and based on a Cadbury focused
in emerging markets. Cadbury benefits of a great image and distribution channels in many of its 
emerging markets, allowing it to increase its revenues, which balances with the economic 
recession in North America and Europe, where chocolates, gums and candies are products 
whose consumption tends to decline. Countries like Asia, India, Indonesia, and Mexico - where 
Cadbury has operations and it is market leader in many segments - are increasing its income in 
which there is a tendency to experiment new products. 
However, despite the economic situation in Europe and North America, consumption 
perceptions point for an increase in Cadbury revenues, since obesity problems and an increase 
of a health consciousness made sugar-free products grow in popularity. In addition, recent 
studies defend the health benefits of dark chocolate and new chocolate’s applications as a source 
of nutrition and energy makes Cadbury products desired by the market. 
16.1.1. BIMA
BIMA is considered a stable with a propensity to grow market where about 30% of total 
revenues come from, where U.K. represents the majority of revenues. U.K. and Ireland 
represents a more mature market, while Middle East and Africa are growing. The U.K. market 
is proving to be resilient in the economic downturn where demand is forecasted51 to continue to 
grow. In Middle East and Africa, Cadbury has a leading position, despite those revenues 
accounting for less than 8% of total revenues. Revenues are going to increase at a CAGR (2010-
2015) of 5%, less than CAGR (2007-2010) of 7%, due to a strong representation in U.K. and 
Ireland, allied to an income increase in Africa and Middle East. 
16.1.2. Europe
Europe represents about 20% of total revenues and is considered a growing market. Since 2007 
this market is growing at a CAGR (2007-2009) of 13% and is going to continue to grow at a 
CAGR (2010-2015) of 4%. Many European countries are passing through an economy 
                                                  
51 Mintel
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recession, which does not encourage the consumption of confectionery products. However, 
Cadbury has conquered North Europe where economic recession is not strongly felt and 
traditionally those countries are more chocolate consumers. 
16.1.3. Americas
Americas represents about 30% of total revenues and is a growing market with a CAGR (2007-
2009) of 15% and is going to continue to grow at a CAGR (2010-2015) of 7%.  Cadbury has 
business in Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia and Peru, all amongst the world’s 50 largest 
markets, where it has a strong market position in almost all of those countries.  
16.1.4. Pacific-Asia
Pacific-Asia accounts for about 20% of total revenues and is the most growing market with a 
CAGR (2007-2009) of 18% and is going to continue to grow at a CAGR (2010-2015) of 4%. 
China’s rapidly increasing live standards is increasing chocolate consumption, as well as gum 
and candy year to year, and is expected to stay this way for the next years. Also, a great variety 
of confectionery products is being demanded and local firms lose advantage to foreign firms, 
since they cannot compete in terms of innovation, research and development and raw materials’ 
quality. China is also a country with lower competition where only the main confectionery 
players have access to that market, meaning that each player have a considerable market share. 
16.2. EBITDA
Even though Revenues were analysed by being divided geographically, due to the lack of 
information EBITDA and EBITDA Margin is going to be analysed by its total consolidated 
value. 
During the realized period, the Cost of Sales margin was 53% during 2007-2008 and increased 
to 54% in 2009. Since commodities prices, mainly cocoa beans’ are very volatile, influenced by 
a ranged of factors and expected52 to slightly increase in the next years, it is assumed that the 
cost of sales margin of 54% will be maintained until 2015. 
                                                  
52 Commodity Briefing
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Operating costs had been increasing with a CAGR (2007-2009) of 7% and are going to continue 
increasing by a CAGR (2010-2015) of 8%. Distribution, Marketing and Administration have a 
CAGR (2007-2009) of 4%, 14% and 5%, respectively and for the forecasted period those costs 
are going to increase to 5%, 13% and 6%, respectively. Cadbury needs to improve its 
distribution channels, mainly in developing markets such as Middle East, Africa, Pacific and 
Asia, as well as invest in Marketing to continue to promote its products not only in the 
developed countries, but also in developing countries where the market is more concentrate due 
to few players. 
From 2007 to 2009, EBITDA had a prominent increase due to an increase in revenues, despite 
the increase in cost of sales and operating costs. The reduction in restructuration costs in 2009 
also contributed for that increase. Regarding the forecasted period, EBITDA will suffer a 
downturn until 2015. This is due to maintenance of 54% of cost of sales margin, as well as the 
1% increase in Distribution, Marketing and Administration costs. The forecasted EBITDA
margin will decrease from 11% in 2010 to 7% in 2015, where in 2007-2009 increased from 6% 
to 14%. 
In conclusion, the EBITDA decrease from 2010-2015 is due to a small revenues increase and 
increase in operating costs, as well as a maintenance of a cost of sales margin at a 54%. 
16.3. Amortization and Depreciation  
In Cadbury’s report, it is possible to observe the range of depreciation percentage for all rubrics 
of tangible assets. However, in the report it is not possible to see the value of each rubric of 
tangible assets, since only two rubrics are displayed. Looking at amortizations from the realized 
period and dividing by tangible assets it is impossible to see a pattern. To try to forecast 
depreciations and to be close to the percentage put in place, an average (16%) of depreciation 
percentage range was computed and applied to tangible assets. Intangible assets amortization 
was assumed to be similar to past values, since it was possible to see a pattern. This method to 
compute depreciations does not take into account capital expenditure - so it is assumed that 
capital expenditure takes place randomly during the year.
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16.4. Capital Expenditure 
Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) in this industry is important in terms of modernizing facilities 
and structures, to support development of new products and to create a more efficient 
production. 
However, there is a lack of information about Cadbury’s CAPEX, since in the report very few is 
said about it, only that the values are supposed to stay in line with 2009 values. 
Regarding that information the forecasted values were very close to the 2009 values. It is known 
that Cadbury has intentions to continue to invest in production capacity improvement, as well as
in the expansion business, mainly in developing markets. 
16.5. Net Working Capital
Working Capital is a measure of operating liquidity, meaning Cadbury’s efficiency and health in 
a short-term period. The Working Capital was computed by the following formula: 
       	        =           +            	        −         	        	
To forecast inventory the past inventory turnover ratio was analysed, which is found by dividing 
the inventory by the total revenues. It the last years, inventory turnover ratio stabilized into 13% 
and it was assumed to remain like that in the future, until 2013 where after that the inventory 
turnover ratio will stay at 12%. (Appendix 18)
Receivables account and Payables account were forecasted based on their past turnover ratio, 
since it is difficult to analyse any trend when divided by COGS53. . 
Analyzing the Receivables and Payables turnover it is possible to analyse that on average, from 
2005 to 2009, Cadbury takes 75 days to receive from its clients and 111 days to pay to its 
suppliers, meaning that Cadbury receives first than it pays.
In conclusion, Net Working Capital is very important to compute cash-flows. A negative net 
working capital (more current liabilities than current assets) represents free cash in the firm.  
Any variation in Net Working Capital will directly affect Enterprise Value.
                                                  
53 Cost of Goods Sold
Sara de Paula Ribeiro                       The Case of Kraft Foods and Cadbury                   67
16.6. Average Weighted Cost of Capital (WACC)
As already as mentioned, to follow the FCFF54 approach it is needed to discount at WACC rate. 
To compute the WACC, it is necessary to follow CAPM formulas to compute the cost of equity.






× (1 −   )
   =    +   (   −   )
According to Damodaran’s Website, equity risk premium (   −   ) for the U.K. market is 
4.5% (Aaa Moody’s rating) with a default probability of 0 basis point, meaning that it is 
assumed that the total equity risk-premium is 4.5%. Also, as already mentioned, to estimate a 
firm’s beta is better to use an industry-derived unlevered beta and re-levered according to firm’s 
capital structure, instead of using an industry-derived levered beta55. (Appendix 19)




According to Bloomberg, Cadbury’s unlevered beta is 0.61 and the re-levered beta is 0.84. To 
compute a risk-free rate, according to the literature56, a 2009 U.K. 10 year Gilt of 4.10% is 
going to be used.  To estimate the corporate tax rate an approximation to the tax in practice was 
used, despite being a difficult task. In the U.K. there are different corporate taxes consonant the 
level of profits. Although Cadbury’s benefits from many different tax benefits that are not 
constant from year to year, so it as assumed that the corporate tax will be 28%, according to the 
JP Morgan report57.
As already mentioned, to compute the cost of debt, one possibility is to compute the average 
cost of debt of each debt rubric, but that information is not possible to find; looking at the ratio 
of interest expenses by Net Debt, it is also difficult to find any trend, since the interest rate 
fluctuates from 2.51% to 9.72%. Other possibility is to use Cadbury’s credit rating, find the 
probability of default and add the risk-free rate. In the report is said that, according to Moody’s, 
credit rating is Baa2, representing a default spread of 2.0% (Damodaran’s Website).  This way, 
the cost of debt is going to be 6.10% (4.1% + 2.0%). 
Finally, is important to define the Cadbury’s capital structure and to highlight the importance of 
this capital structure in market values.  The target D/E ratio should of 53%.
                                                  
54 Free Cash Flow to the Firm
55 Copeland, T. et al (2000)
56 Copeland, T. et al (2000)
57 J.P. Morgan Europe Equity Research 9 November 2009
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In this way it is possible to compute the WACC. The cost of equity levered is 7.89% and cost of 
equity unlevered – necessary to compute Enterprise Value through APV approach – is 6.85%. 
The Average Weighted cost of capital is 6.73%.
The Enterprise Value (EV) using DFC approach, already mentioned in the literature, is £8.50
billion ($ 14.20 billion). (Appendix 20)
16.7. Adjusted Present Value (APV) 
As already mentioned, according to the literature, to compute The Enterprise Value using the 
APV approach requires the independent analysis of Enterprise Value unlevered and then adding 
the financial side effect taking into account costs of financial distress.
To compute the Enterprise Value unlevered, the FCFF needs to be discounted from the cost of 
equity unlevered of 6.85%. To analyse the financial side effects, it is necessary to compute the 
present value of interest tax shield (PVITS) and, for that, the assumption of corporate tax rate, 
the target capital structure (53%), Net debt and the cost of debt (6.10%) are needed.
The last part is composed by costs of financial distress. The default of probability for a company 
with a firm rated Baa2 is 2.00% and the cost of financial distress for this industry is assumed to 
be 50%, meaning that in case of distress, Cadbury will lose 50% of its total assets. 
Following this approach, the Enterprise Value is £ 8.50 billion ($ 14.20 billion). (Appendix 21)
17. Relative Valuation 
The peer group was chosen according to the most relevant firms in the confectionery industry. 
However, certain firms chosen are more diversified in terms of consumer segments than 
Cadbury, but they were chosen because its capital structures, risk and growth are quite 
comparable. 
The indicators were collected from the Bloomberg for 2010 analysis; however indicators for 
Kraft Foods and Cadbury were taken from its current valuation. 
There were computed four different multiples Price-to Earnings ratio (P/E), Price to Book ratio 
(P/B), Enterprise-Value to Sales (EV/Sales) and Enterprise-Value to EBITDA (EV/EBITDA).
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The first multiple P/E is considered one of the most important multiples, since it shows the 
investors’ expectations of how much they are willing to pay. Kraft Foods’ P/E is trading at a 
reasonable fair value but the lowest comparing with its peers. Looking at P/B ratio, Kraft Foods 
has a lower ratio compared with its peers, meaning that the stock could be undervalued and no 
growth expectations are taking into account by investors. 
The next multiples are enterprise-value multiples what have the advantage of not being easily 
manipulated as equity multiples are. 
To better analyse the peer group, multiples were divided into minimum (min), average and 
maximum (max). As is possible to observe in the graphics the range given by EV/EBITDA is 
that Enterprise-Value should be between £ 6.72 billion and £10.79 billion and using EV/Sales, 
Enterprise-Value should be between £ 10.10 billion and £ 12.81billion. 
In EV/EBITDA Cadbury’s valuation seems to be above the average of its peers, but inside the 
range. In turn, in EV/Sales Cadbury’s valuation is underperformed comparing with its peers. 
As already mentioned, it is important to highlight that multiples should give a range or a rough 
idea of what the Enterprise-Value should be and must not be taken as the main valuation 
process, since comparable firms are very difficult to find, because there are no two similar firms 
as said before. 





P/E P/Book EV/Sales EV/EBITDA
Hershey US 10,70 18,49 11,86 2,06 11,64
Kellog US 20,29 16,52 8,93 1,98 12,41
General Mills US 23,38 15,29 4,33 2,01 11,10
Nestlé SW 190,94 21,06 2,88 2,08 11,72
Unilever UK 87,51 15,43 4,52 1,64 9,54
Kraft Foods US 40,17 14,11 1,74 1,86 15,31
Average - 16,82 5,71 1,94 11,95
Bloomberg Multiples -2010
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18. Sensitivity Analysis 
Cadbury’s assumptions also follow a conservative approach and to perform a better valuation it 
is important to analyses a possible deviation from the previous assumptions to understand the 
impact in the Enterprise Value. 
Cadbury is performing in a competitive market having good growth perceptions mainly in 
developing markets, with leading positions in many countries. 
Figure 29 - Cadbury's EV to EBITDA
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This sensitivity analysis allows makes it possible to measure the impact of different assumptions 
in the valuation process. The first sensitivity analysis considers a variation in revenues, cost of 
sales and operating costs, which derived in two different case scenarios: bear case scenario and 
bull case scenario.
The bear case scenario considers revenues 1% lower for each forecasted year, where the cost of 
sales and operating costs are 1% higher for each forecasted year. The opposite scenario, the bull 
case, considers revenues 1% higher for each forecasted year, where the cost of sales and 
operating costs are 1% lower for each forecasted year. (Appendix 22 and 23)
The bear case results in an Enterprise Value by the DFC approach of £ 5.64 billion and a target 
price of £3.12, where the bull case shows an Enterprise Value by the DFC approach of £10.70
billion and a target price of £6.82. This shows how much the Enterprise Value is sensible to 
different variations in assumptions. 
The second sensitivity analysis is related to a variation in WACC and growth rate using the 
Base Case. By using a range of WACC and terminal growth rate, it is possible to see the impact 
on the target price. 
        
Looking at the table is possible to observe that by varying WACC and the terminal growth rate, 
the target price suffers a variation between £ 4.76 and £5.90. 
To conclude this sensitivity analysis, it is possible to infer that Cadbury is overvalued since its 
share price at 9th November of 2009 is higher than any price-target projected in case scenarios. 
The sensitivity analysis also illustrates that since there are no target prices higher than £7.58.
Table  6 - Cadbury's Scenarios
Table  7 - Cadbury's Sensitivity Analysis
Bear Case Base Case Bull Case
DCF 5 637£     8 495£     10 696£   
Target Price 3,12£       5,21£       6,82£       
* In billio ns  o f P o unds  (e xpect Target P ric e )
2,20% 2,35% 2,50% 2,65% 2,80%
6,45% 5,14£       7,07£       5,49£       5,69£       5,90£       
6,73% 4,79£       4,94£       5,09£      5,26£       5,45£       
6,75% 4,76£       4,91£       5,07£       5,23£       5,41£       
P ric e  Ta rg e t  
Growth Rate
WACC
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19. Kraft Foods & Cadbury Merged Valuation
In the previous section, Kraft Foods and Cadbury were valued independently according to the 
procedures related with the first step of the valuation process. 
According to Damodaran (2005), to value a merger between two entities, first it is necessary to 
evaluate both entities separately (Status Quo Valuation) under its own assumptions and, after 
that, in a second stage, it is necessary to combine both enterprises values to have access to a
merger valuation without synergies that should be equal to the sum of the two entities.
To compute a valuation with synergies some assumptions regarding operational and financial 
synergies must be done. Basically, a new model is created where the benefits – mainly in form 
of cost savings and revenues-enhancement- of having the two firms together are explored.
The difference between the merged valuation with synergies and the merged valuation without 
synergies represents the value of synergies, which is the additional value generated by 
combining two firms that it would not be created if the firms were operated independently 
(Damodaran, 2005). 
In this section, the second and third stages are going to be modeled and its respective 
assumptions are going to be explained. 
19.1. Merged Valuation without Synergies
In this section no synergies were considered. The model assumes the individual assumptions of 
each firm – Kraft Foods and Cadbury - and it is equal to sum of each part.
It is important to highlight that this is a cross-border merger where Kraft Foods is an American 
firm and Cadbury is an English firm, in which its statements are expressed in dollar and pounds, 
respectively. Since the acquisition is bidden by Kraft Foods it is assumed that the deal is going 
to be done in dollars. Cadbury’s cash flows were estimated and discounted according to 
Cadbury’s discounted rate and the Net Present Value of its valuation was converted to US 
Dollar at the spot exchange rate of 1.6719 (GBP/USD) from 9th November of 2009, following 
Method A as presented in section 6.2 of this dissertation. 
The Income Statement and the Free Cash Flow (Appendix 24 and 25) of the combined firm
were estimated as the direct sum of Kraft Foods ($ 62.12 billion) and Cadbury ($ 14.20 billion)
independent valuation. 
The total value of the merged valuation without synergies using WACC is $ 76.32 billion. 
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19.2. Merged Valuation with Synergies 
By merging both firms a creation of a certain number of opportunities that would not be 
generated independently are expected. Both Kraft Foods and Cadbury operate in the Food 
Industry and share the same consumer segment of confectionery, so it is possible to analyse
some functional strength that can be transferred and shared across both firms.
These firms compete in a global highly competitive market, where not only price matters for 
consumers, but also product’s diversity, quality and innovation. 
To be able to deliver those characteristics to consumers, a cyclical process of managing input 
costs to improve brand equity is necessary, to invest in R&D and to drive progress in every 
geographic region setting solid objectives to explore sales opportunities and reinvest to maintain 
future growth.
To obtain that it is important to achieve a certain operating income margin to release funding for 
efficiency-improvement projects.
Merging with another firm can allow the creation of operational and financial synergies. 
Operating synergies are those synergies that allow firms to increase their operating income from 
existing assets and/or increase growth.58 There are two types of operational synergies: revenue-
enhancing and cost-related. Revenue-enhancing synergies are quite difficult to measure, since it 
is not possible to evaluate with precision how much sales are going to increase in a certain 
period of time. In that way it turns out to be easier to quantify cost-related synergies, such as 
economies of scale and overlapping of operational activities, and build it in valuation models.
Financial synergies are related to the impact on the cost of capital of the merger entity or in a 
form of higher cash flows. The combined firms should have a cost of capital lower than 
separately, also if its cash flows are not perfectly correlated, it reduces its volatility and it should 
reduce bankruptcy risk. In addition, there are also financial synergies in tax benefits and cash 
slack, as mentioned in the Literature Section, but those are not going to be deeply focused.
Despite this merger being made in 2010, Kraft Foods’ intentions for Cadbury started in the 
beginning of 2009 and most equity analysts started their estimations immediately, updating 
them as the quarterly results of both firms were published during that year. For a matter of 
simplicity and since the annual results of 2009 for both firms are already released, it is assumed 
that synergies started in 2010 due to the potential cost savings resulting from the regional 
overlap in the operational activities.  
                                                  
58 Damodaran (2005)
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19.2.1. Revenue-enhancing Synergies
As already mentioned, it is difficult to quantify revenue-enhancing synergies. In this valuation,
revenues synergies were not explored due to the lack of information. However, the merger 
between Kraft Foods and Cadbury allows the potential of cross-selling for both entities. Kraft 
Foods will benefit from Cadbury’s larger international presence and growth in emerging 
markets, especially in India, Mexico and South America, to spread its own products, such as 
powdered soft drinks, sheltered by Cadbury’s brand image and distribution channels. At the 
same time, Cadbury will benefit from the merger by enjoying Kraft Foods’ distribution 
channels, especially in the U.S., allowing an increase in Cadbury’s market share.
So, an increase in revenues in almost every consumer segments is expected, especially in snacks 
(that incorporates confectionery) and beverages. 
Together, Kraft Foods and Cadbury will lead market share by revenues and, at the same time, 
both firms will reduce theirs competition, allowing better revenues margins.
19.2.2. Cost-Related Synergies 
Differently from revenues-enhancement synergies, cost-related synergies are easiest to compute 
and to model. 
Kraft Foods estimates59 through Cadbury’s operating costs of 2008 synergies of $625 million 
what represents 8% of Cadbury’s cost base. Kraft Foods expected to create $ 300 million in 
operational synergies (procurement, manufacturing, logistics, R&D and costumer services), $ 
200 million in G&A savings and $125 million in marketing and selling expenses. In the same 
report, JP Morgan estimates that cost synergies could be $1.7 billion due to a significant 
regional overlap in operational activities.
I believe that JP Morgan estimates are too optimistic; on the other hand Kraft Foods’ estimates 
appear to be more accurate. Despite following JP Morgan’s relational about regional overlap I 
computed my own perspective of how cost synergies should be (Table 8).
As it is possible to observe my perspective about cost savings is more conservative, only 
exceeding Kraft Foods’ estimates starting from 2014.  
                                                  
59 J.P. Morgan Europe Equity Research 18 September 2009
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In terms of product the overlap is minimal, not only chocolate is  the only product in common 
between Kraft Foods and Cadbury, the markets where both are located with the same product 
are minimal too, just in Western Europe. According to JP Morgan60 only 12% of Kraft Foods’ 
total sales in 2008 ($ 5.3 billion) are respected to confectionery. 
However, in terms of regional levels the overlap is significant in distribution, R&D, Marketing 
and G&A. 
Cadbury’s G&A could be partially absorbed by Kraft Foods own G&A in some regions during 
the five years and after this period be totally absorbed. For Europe (EU) and North America 
(NA), I assumed, based on the presence of Kraft Foods and Cadbury in those countries, a cost 
saving of 30% in each year and after 2015 a cost saving of almost 50%. For other regions (L/A, 
EE, Asia and ME&A) it was assumed a cost saving of 15% in each year and after 2015 a cost 
saving of almost 100%. 
Distribution costs is the cost area where less cost savings are expected, since Kraft Foods is a 
giant in the food industry with several consumer segments, other than confectionery, and with 
hundreds of different brands. It is difficult to believe that Kraft Foods could be easily filled with 
Cadbury’s products.  For NA, Asia, L/A and EE it was assumed a cost saving of 40% in each 
year and after 2015 a cost saving of almost 50%.  For Europe and ME&A a cost saving of 20% 
and 10%, respectively,  in each year and after 2015 a cost saving of more than 50% for both.
                                                  
60 J.P. Morgan Europe Equity Research 18 September 2009
(in $ million)
Operating Expenses
Distribution 144 18% 150 18% 156 17% 164 17% 172 17% 181 16%
R&D 50 6% 48 6% 50 6% 53 5% 56 5% 59 5%
Marketing 165 21% 185 22% 209 23% 238 25% 266 26% 298 27%
G&A 434 55% 456 54% 483 54% 512 53% 543 52% 570 51%
Synergy in 2012 Synergy in 2013 Synergy in 2014 Synergy in 2015
839 100% 898 100% 967 100% 1037 100% 1108 100%
Synergy in 2010 
Total 100%793
Synergy in 2011
( $ million) 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E
G&A Cadbury Pre-Merger 1 930 2 027 2 148 2 277 2 414 2 534
Assuming 50% belongs to EU and NA * 965 1 013 1 074 1 139 1 207 1 267
Cost Savings of 30% 290 304 322 342 362 380
Other Regions 965 1 013 1 074 1 139 1 207 1 267
Cost Savings of 15% 145 152 161 171 181 190
Total Saving 434 456 483 512 543 570
G&A Cadbury Pro-Merger 1 496 1 571 1 665 1 765 1 871 1 964
* Based on JP Morgan estimates
Table  9 - G&A Cost Savings
Table  8 – Breakdown of Cost Savings
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Cadbury’s “marketing” costs, that are mainly selling expenses, in some regions can be absorbed  
by Kraft Foods sales force, especially in NA, L/A, EE and Asia where Kraft Foods presence is 
meaningful. In Europe and ME&A, the cost savings are inferior, since Kraft Foods’ sales force 
in those regions is not quite strong.  It is assumed for NA, L/A, EE and Asia a cost saving of 
20% in each year and after 2015 a cost saving of almost 80%. For Europe and ME&A, a cost 
saving of 20% and 10%, respectively, in each year and after 2015 the same base cost saving it is 
going to be maintained. 
As mentioned, the only common product between both firms is chocolate, and the impact that 
confectionery has in Kraft Foods’ total sales is almost residual comparing with its other 
consumer segments. In this way, it was assumed only a cost saving of 10% in R&D in each 
year, since little expertise should be shared between both firms. 
Due to the lack of information about Kraft Foods’ and Cadbury’s input costs, since the values 
are presented as cost of sales, no estimate of synergy was made. However, it is important to 
( $ million) 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E
Distribution Cadbury Pre-Merger 451 469 488 512 538 565
Assuming 30% Belongs to NA and Asia* 135 141 146 154 161 169
Cost Savings of 40% 54 56 59 61 65 68
Assuming 30% Belongs to EU* 135 141 146 154 161 169
Cost Savings of 20% 27 28 29 31 32 34
Assuming 25% Belongs to L/A and EE 113 117 122 128 135 141
Cost Savings of 50% 56 59 61 64 67 71
Assuming 15% Belongs to ME&A 68 70 73 77 81 85
Cost Savings of 10% 7 7 7 8 8 8
Total Saving 144 150 156 164 172 181
( $ million) 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E
Marketing Cadbury Pre-Merger 1.178 1.319 1.491 1.699 1.903 2.132
Assuming 60% Belongs to NA, L/A, EE and China 589 660 745 850 952 1.066
Cost Savings of 20% 118 132 149 170 190 213
Assuming 30% Belongs to EU 353 396 447 510 571 639
Cost Savings of 10% 35 40 45 51 57 64
Assuming 10% Belongs to ME&A 118 132 149 170 190 213
Cost Savings of 10% 12 13 15 17 19 21
Total Saving 165 185 209 238 266 298
( $ million) 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E
R&D Kraft Foods Pre-Merger 498 477 496 526 557 585
Cost Savings of 10% 50 48 50 53 56 59
Table  10 - Distribution Cost Savings
Table  11 - Marketing Cost Savings
Table  12 - R&D Cost Savings
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highlight that this scenario of synergies is very conservative and does not account for revenues-
enhancements synergies and synergies in input costs. 
19.2.3. Financial Synergies and Capital Structure
By merging both entities there are changes in the capital structure. According to Damodaran 
(2005), the unlevered beta of the new merged firm (0.55) is computed through a weighting 
formula of Kraft Foods’ and Cadbury’s unlevered betas. Then, according to the formulas 
mentioned in section 3.5, it is possible to find the beta levered (0.93). Assuming that the merged 
firm risk free is 3.84% % (US 10 year Treasury Bond) and the total risk premium of 4.50%, the 
new firm’s cost of equity unlevered and levered is 6.33% and 8.01%, respectively.
Regarding to the cost of debt by merging both entities, it is assumed that the debt capacity 
increased, since the cash flows become less volatile. As Damodaran’s website suggests, with an 
interest coverage ratio of 4, the respective cost of debt for the new entity is 6.02% with a credit 
rating of Baa2 and a default probability of 2.00%, where the new entity’s cost of capital is 
6.08%.
Also, it is assumed that the new entity will write up the assets by U.S. Tax Laws of 31.50% 
where it could take more advantages from interest tax shields. 
To finance the acquisition of Cadbury, in 2010, Kraft Foods increased its debt by $15.86 billion
which was reflected on an interest coverage ratio of 4. Due to financial synergies from the 
Table  13 - Merged Firm Capital Structure
Kraft Cadbury Merged
Cost of Capital 6,21% 6,33% 6,08%
Cost of Equity (L) 7,35% 7,62% 8,01%
Cost of Equity (U) 6,27% 6,85% 6,33%
Cost of Debt 5,84% 6,10% 6,02%
Default Spread 2,00% 2,00% 2,00%
Credit Rating Baa2 Baa2 Baa2
Beta (L) 0,74 0,84 0,93
Beta (U) 0,54 0,61 0,55
Risk-Free 3,84% 4,10% 3,84%
Total Risk Premium 4,50% 4,50% 4,50%
Taxes 31,50% 28,00% 31,50%
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merger, the new firm maintained the same credit rating of Baa2 with a cost of debt of 6.02%, 
lower than Cadbury’s cost of debt. 
19.3. Value of Synergy 
The total value of synergies estimated for the merger between Kraft Foods and Cadbury is $4.26
billion. This value represents 25% of Cadbury’s market value as of 9th November of 2009. 
As it already was mentioned, costs-related synergies are more reliable to be computed. In this 
valuation, it was estimated that cost-related synergies accounts for more than 50% of total 
synergies. These cost savings are expected through regional overlapping in operational 
activities, such as Marketing, R&D, Distribution and G&A.
Revenue-enhancement synergies were not explored in this valuation. However, both Kraft 
Foods and Cadbury will benefit from the merger, since it will be possible to enter in new and 
already existent markets by taking advantage on both brand image and sales force. 
Financial synergies were estimated due to a new debt capacity by the merger of the two entities. 
It is estimated that the new entity will maintain the credit rating at Baa2. However the merged 
firm will have a debt increase of $15.90 billion reflecting an interest coverage ratio of 4 that 
represents a cost of debt for 6.02%. Also, tax benefits will be created by writing the new assets 
with a higher tax, benefiting of higher interest tax shields. 
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20. Acquisition 
This dissertation’s section will consider a more strategic part of the deal. It is going to be 
discussed and presented the procedures related with synergies’ value analysis that determine the 
acquisition’s offer for Cadbury. The acquisition’s offer and the premium offer are going to be 
determined. Also some tools for measuring the risk of acquisition – SVAR - and to help in the 
decision making of the acquiring firm – Meet-the-Premium Line – are going to be presented, as 
already were mentioned in literature section. 
It is important to highlight, that in reality Cadbury’s acquisition by Kraft Foods occurred in 
February of 2010, however this valuation process is independent from what happened in reality. 
For this dissertation only public available information about Kraft Food and Cadbury were used.
No detailed information about the deal after it was realized was used. This means that the results 
in this valuation are not comparable to the real deal occurred in 2010.
All the information presented in this section will continue to follow the same valuation process 
pattern in this dissertation.
To briefly summarize, Kraft Foods was the world’s second largest manufacturer and packager 
food products and Cadbury was the world’s second largest confectionery firm, with a market 
capitalization of $ 39.69 billion and £ 10.35 billion ($ 17.31billion), respectively. 
Each standalone valuations – the net present value of expected future cash flows – estimate that 
Kraft Foods and Cadbury’s Enterprise Values are $ 62.12 billion and £ 8.50 billion ($ 14.20
billion). Combined without synergies both firms values $ 75.86 billion. With synergies the 
combined firms value $76.32 billion using the WACC approach and $76.31 billion using the
APV approach, generating synergies of $4.26 billion and $4.27 billion, respectively. 
20.1. Acquisition Offer
To calculate how the synergies benefit should be distributed among both firms, it is important to
understand how each firm’s skills and capabilities contribute for the creation of synergies; 
however it is not simple to replicate in a model the impact of each firm in the total synergies 
value. Most synergies will be created in Kraft Foods’ side due to its sales force and G&A 
functions. 
To compute the acquisition offer it is important to find a metric that allows the distribution of 
the impact in total synergies value by each firm. A weighted division of total synergies value 
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based on Enterprise Value it is the best approach to reflect both skills and capabilities 
contributed by each firm. 
Cadbury’s Enterprise Value represents 18% of the Enterprise Value of the merger entity without 
synergies. Following the criteria already mentioned, Cadbury shall receive 18% of the value of 
total synergies. In this way, Kraft Foods shall give to Cadbury an additional $632 million.
Cadbury’s market value at 9th of November of 2009 was $ 17.31 billion and Cadbury’s 
valuation identifies an equity value of $ 5.89 billion. With the percentage of synergies belonging
to Cadbury (19%), the new equity value is $ 6.68 billion (13% upside potential of the old 
equity). To summarize, according to Cadbury’s market capitalization at 9th of November of 
2009, the total premium offer is 39% (in relation to the new equity value) and the real premium 
offer is 21%. 
20.2. Shareholder’s Value at Risk 
According to Sirower & Sahni (2006), there is a method of measuring synergy risk during the 
acquiring process. That method is inspired on the VAR concept where it shows how much of 
the acquirer firm’s value is at risk if no post-acquisition synergies are realized according to what 




The total premium offered is $10.63 billion and Kraft Foods’ market value is $ 39.69 billion 
resulting in a SVAR of 27%. 
Table  14 – Acquisition Offer
($ million)
Synergy 4 264
% Cadbury MV 25%
% paid to Cadbury 19%
Synergy Premium 793
Cadbury Market Cap 17 311
Cadbury Equity 5 888
Cadbury Equity + Synergy 6 682
Cadbury Market Cap + Synergy 18 105
Cadbury EV + Synergy 14 996
Total Premium Offered 39%
Real Premium Offered 21%
SVAR 27%
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20.3. Synergies to Meet the Premium
As already mentioned in the literature section synergies are difficult to measure and, to avoid 
paying a high premium for a firm that will not create the expected synergy, Sirower & Sahni 
(2006), suggested a model that represents graphically the cost reductions ( cost-synergies) and 





According to the formula above, if there were only cost-synergies (revenues – enhancement 
synergies are equal to zero), costs would have to be 3.37%, to justify the real acquisition 
premium (21%). On the other hand, if there were only revenues-enhancement synergies (cost-
synergies are equal to zero) they should have to be 21%.
Those values give us the coordinates for the Meet-the-Premium Line.
To compute the expectable synergies to 
evaluate if there is enough synergy mix to 
justify the premium offered, it was 
assumed the existence of revenues-
enhancement with a CAGR (2010-2015) 
of 2% and that %SynR is equal to the 
percentage average of the additional value 
in revenues enhancement synergies from 
the merger by Cadbury’s revenues from 
2010 to 2015, discounted by Cadbury’s 
WACC. The same process was made for 
computing %SynC. (Appendix 29)
At last, the “plausible box”- that is a hypothetical range that provides supporting evidence, as a 
“sanity check tool” given different combinations of costs and revenues synergies – was set at 
10%.
According to the graphic, the synergy mix of cost and revenue synergies is sufficient enough
compensate the premium paid (the expectable synergies are above the line). However, the 
combination of required synergies may not be probable, according to the “plausible box”, 
meaning that is important to review the determinants of the synergy mix 














Meet the Premium Line
Expectable Synergies %SynR %SynC
21% Premium
14% EBIT
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As it is possible to observe in the Capabilities/Market Access Matrix (Sirower& Sahnim, 2006), 
with the merger of Kraft Foods and Cadbury, Kraft Foods is the firm that is going to benefit 
more in terms of value creation by synergies, as already was mentioned. 
In general terms, Snacks*61, Cheese, Grocery and Convenient Meals are consumer segments 
that will not change in terms of capabilities, since their R&D, product design, product portfolio, 
cost structure and supply chain  will maintain as before. Of course, it is important to highlight 
that those consumer segments will also benefit from synergies, but no considerable changes are 
expected from capabilities. In case of Market Access, those consumer segments will benefit 
from the merger, since they will have better sales force, third-party relationships, brand, channel 
power and new geographies. The impact of the access to new geographies is the most significant 
improvement and it is the strategy behind Kraft Foods real interest in Cadbury, as it was already 
mentioned in Section 12, and it is possible to observe in the Geographies Matrix (Figure 36).
20.4. Mode of Acquisition 
According to the literature62, an acquisition can take several forms resulting in different 
outcomes.
In this case, it is suggested to Kraft Foods acquires Cadbury through a tender offer, where Kraft 
Foods commits itself publicly to buy Cadbury’s outstanding shares at a specific price. 
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Since both firms belong to the same industry, this acquisition is considered a horizontal merger. 
Both firms benefit if the acquisition is friendly, in terms of acculturation process, and for that 
Kraft Foods’ proposal offer for Cadbury, should be higher enough to send a friendly message to 
Cadbury’s board.
20.5. Method of Payment 
Literature indicates that is possible to finance a M&A through cash, stock or a mix of cash and 
stock, however the finance type have a significant influence in M&A profitability, since it sends 
different messages to the market, because the market tend to understand the method of payment 
as how much confidence the acquirer has in the deal.  In this case, Kraft Foods should finance 
the acquisition in a way that sends to the markets a confidence signal and at the same a friendly 
signal to Cadbury to avoid a hostile takeover. 
Presently, Kraft Foods is undervalued, meaning that issuing new shares to finance the 
acquisition will result in a dilution (the issuing price will devalue comparing with the fair 
value). Because of this, Kraft Foods will avoid to pay with stock. 
To pass a confidence level to the deal, Kraft Foods should finance the deal with cash or with a 
mix of cash and stock, according to the merger’s capital structure. 
20.6. Kraft Foods’ Offer Details 
Kraft Foods is going to pay 21% of premium over Cadbury’s Enterprise Value and pretends to 
pay primarily in cash. Cadbury’s acquisition price of $ 18.10 billion corresponds to an offer of 
$13.25 (£7.93) per share.
This acquisition is going to be paid with cash and debt more specifically with 88% of Debt and 
12% with cash. This value of cash amounts to $2.2 billion and corresponds to an emission of 
almost 90 million new shares – conversion rate corresponds to Kraft Foods’ price target ($30.39
per share). The value of debt corresponds to $15.90 billion.
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21. Conclusion
Despite Food & Beverage Industry being a non-cyclical industry, it is a highly competitive one, 
where players compete for price, quality, innovation, brand recognition and loyalty.  Due to the 
bargaining power of costumers, Food market players suffer high pressure to reduce its prices, to 
maintain market-share, as well as efficiency and at the same time, satisfy the costumers’ 
expectations and preferences.
Also, due to the economic instability that is plaguing developed countries consumer spending is 
declining. At the same time, in developing countries, the income level is increasing making 
those countries highly attractive for Food market players as a key to gaining market-share and to 
increase profits, since developed countries are stagnant.
In this context, Kraft Foods believe that acquiring Cadbury, a firm that has market-share in 
more than 60 countries with a CAGR (2003-2005) in emerging markets of 12% , it is a 
profitable strategy to have access to new markets taking advantage of Cadbury’s capabilities 
and distribution channels. Also, Kraft Foods pretends to benefit from Cadbury’s brand 
recognition into its products. 
Together, Kraft Foods and Cadbury will become the largest manufacturer and packager food 
products in the world. Benefiting from economies of scale, Kraft Foods will be more efficient 
and better price competitive than its competitors. Kraft Foods’ beverage consumer segment will 
increase in market share and in profits through Cadbury’s connection with India, where Kraft 
Foods finally will be able to sell its own drink products. This merger will generate synergies in 
costs, revenues and also financial synergies.
Cost synergies are the most reliable source of synergies and in this particularly case, account for 
50% of the total synergies created. On the other hand, revenues-enhancement synergies are 
difficult to evaluate since they are very unpredictable. To compute the value of synergy no 
revenues-enhancement were taking into account. However, for plotting the Meet-the-Premium 
Line, it was assumed a revenue-enhancement with a CAGR (2010-2015) of 2%. 
Kraft Foods should acquire Cadbury through a tender offer. The synergies are valued in $4.26 
billion and Kraft Foods should pay £7.93 for each Cadbury’s shares. Kraft Foods should pay 
88% in Debt and 12% in Cash through an emission of almost 90 million new shares. 
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Appendix
Appendix  1 - Confectionery Market Share
Appendix  2 - Chocolate Market Share
Appendix  3 - Gum Market Share
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Appendix 5 - Kraft Foods' Operating Costs
Appendix 6 - Cadbury's Revenues by Consumer Segment
Appendix  4 - Sugar Market Share
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Appendix  7 - Cadbury's Operating Costs
Appendix  8 - Kraft Foods' Income Statement
Kraft Foods Income Statement (in million $)
2005-2008 2009-2015
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009* CAGR %  2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E CAGR %  
Net Revenues 32 779 33 018 35 858 41 932 40 396 11,0% 40 781 41 735 42 241 43 195 43 680 44 771 1,9%
North America
Snacks 5 704 5 951 5 929 2,0% 5 959 6 048 6 078 6 139 6 200 6 448 1,6%
Beverages 3 499 3 509 3 545 0,7% 3 570 3 595 3 598 3 602 3 606 3 631 0,3%
Cheese 5 199 5 525 4 980 -2,1% 4 955 4 931 4 926 4 931 4 936 4 940 -0,1%
Grocery 3 138 3 211 3 136 0,0% 3 120 3 136 3 152 3 167 3 183 3 199 0,5%
Convenient Meals 5 336 5 760 6 072 6,7% 6 193 6 317 6 380 6 508 6 638 6 837 2,0%
Total 22 876 23 956 23 662 1,7% 23 798 24 027 24 134 24 347 24 563 25 056 1,0%
Europe
Snacks 2 833 5 291 4 776 29,8% 4 752 4 847 4 896 4 994 5 094 5 348 2,4%
Beverages 2 456 2 625 2 390 -1,4% 2 276 2 265 2 242 2 220 2 231 2 242 -0,3%
Cheese 1 019 1 109 972 -2,3% 967 972 967 972 977 982 0,3%
Grocery 363 394 369 0,8% 362 364 365 367 369 371 0,5%
Convenient Meals 336 309 261 -11,9% 274 288 294 299 305 311 2,6%
Total 7 007 9 728 8 768 11,9% 8 631 8 735 8 764 8 853 8 976 9 255 1,4%
Developing Markets 
Snacks 2 824 4 668 4 337 23,9% 4 684 5 059 5 413 5 846 5 963 5 993 5,1%
Beverages 1 830 2 081 2 094 7,0% 2 199 2 419 2 419 2 612 2 612 2 873 5,5%
Cheese 710 828 844 9,0% 886 895 904 913 922 931 1,0%
Grocery 519 567 566 4,4% 583 600 606 625 643 663 2,6%
Convenient Meals 92 104 115 11,8% 123 132 141 155 170 188 8,8%
Total 5 975 8 248 7 956 15,39% 8 352 8 973 9 342 9 996 10 140 10 460 4,6%
Cost of Sales 21 115 21 190 23 656 28 088 25 786 - 26 508 27 128 27 456 28 077 28 392 29 101 -
% of Revenues 64% 64% 66% 67% 64% - 65% 65% 65% 65% 65% 65% -
Gross Profit 11 664 11 828 12 202 13 844 14 600 - 14 273 14 607 14 784 15 118 15 288 15 670 -
Marketing 1 314 1 396 1 471 1 639 1 648 - 1 763 1 887 1 962 2 041 2 122 2 250 -
G&A 5 436 5 434 5 674 6 725 6 983 - 7 053 7 264 7 482 7 632 7 785 8 018 -
R&D 385 419 442 498 477 - 496 526 557 585 615 645 -
Total 7 135 7 249 7 587 8 862 9 108 - 9 312 9 677 10 002 10 258 10 522 10 913 -
Asset Impairment and Exit Costs 479 1 062 440 1 024 -64 - 500 500 500 500 500 500 -
(Gains)/Losses on Net divestitures -108 -117 -14 92 6 - -50 -50 -50 -50 -50 -50 -
Amortization of Intangibles 10 7 13 23 26 - 15 15 15 15 15 15 -
Operating Income 4 373 4 158 4 176 3 843 5 524 - 4 496 4 465 4 317 4 395 4 301 4 291 3,2%
EBITDA 4 529 4 579 4 615 4 982 5 492 - 4 961 4 930 4 782 4 860 4 766 4 757 -0,8%
EBITDA Margin 14% 14% 13% 12% 14% - 12% 12% 11% 11% 11% 11% -
Interest and other expense, net 635 510 604 1 240 1 237 - 953 949 944 940 935 928 -
Earnings from continuing operations before income taxes 3 738 3 648 3 572 2 603 4 287 - 3 543 3 516 3 373 3 455 3 366 3 364 -
Provision for income taxes 1 066 816 1 080 755 1 259 - 1 116 1 107 1 062 1 088 1 060 1 060 -
Earnings from continuing operations 2 672 2 832 2 492 1 848 3 028 - 2 427 2 408 2 310 2 367 2 306 2 304 -
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Appendix  9 - Kraft Foods' Balance Sheet
Appendix  10 - Kraft Foods Net Debt and WC
Balance Sheet (in millions $)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E
Assets
Cash and Cash Equivalents 316 239 567 1 244 2 101 2 206 2 316 2 432 2 554 2 681 2 816
Receivables 3 385 3 869 5 197 4 704 5 197 5 561 5 950 6 426 7 004 7 635 8 322
Inventories, net 3 343 3 506 4 096 3 881 3 775 3 851 3 889 3 928 4 006 4 287 4 630
Deferred Income Taxes 879 387 575 804 730 730 730 730 730 730 730
Other Current Assets 230 253 302 828 651 651 651 651 651 651 651
Total Current Assets 8 153 8 224 10 737 11 461 12 454 13 048 13 588 14 223 15 005 16 048 17 216
Property, Pland and Equipment, net 16 598 17 357 10 778 9 917 10 693 10 907 11 125 11 236 11 349 11 462 11 577
Goodwill 24 648 25 553 31 193 27 581 28 764 29 339 29 926 30 225 30 528 30 833 31 141
Intangible Assets, net 10 516 10 177 12 200 12 926 13 429 13 698 13 972 14 111 14 252 14 395 14 539
Prepaid Pension Assets 3 617 1 168 1 648 56 115 300 300 300 300 300 300
Other Assets 877 729 1 437 1 232 1 259 1 259 1 259 1 259 1 259 1 259 1 259
Total Assets 57 628 55 574 67 993 63 173 66 714 68 551 70 170 71 354 72 692 74 297 76 032
Liabilities
Short-term Borrowings 805 1 715 7 385 897 453 498 548 603 663 730 803
Current Portion of Long-term Debt 1 268 1 418 722 765 513 523 534 539 544 550 555
Accounts Payable 2 270 2 602 4 065 3 373 3 766 4 030 4 352 4 744 5 265 5 897 6 664
Accrued Marketing 1 529 1 626 1 833 1 803 2 181 2 268 2 359 2 453 2 551 2 654 2 760
Accrued Employment Costs 625 750 913 951 1 175 1 410 1 424 1 438 1 452 1 467 1 482
Other Current Liabilities 1 338 1 559 1 654 3 255 3 403 3 823 3 772 3 338 3 361 3 379 3 390
Total Current Liabilities 7 860 9 699 16 613 11 044 11 491 12 588 13 027 13 156 13 882 14 725 15 707
Long-term Debt 8 475 7 081 12 902 18 589 18 024 18 384 18 752 18 940 19 129 19 320 19 514
Deferred Income Taxes 6 067 3 930 4 876 4 064 4 508 4 508 4 508 4 508 4 508 4 508 4 508
Accrued Pension Costs 0 1 022 810 2 367 1 765 1 783 1 800 1 818 1 837 1 855 1 874
Accrued Postretirement health care costs 1 931 3 014 2 846 2 678 2 816 2 844 2 873 2 901 2 930 2 960 2 989
Other Liabilities 2 838 1 499 2 178 2 075 2 138 2 138 2 138 2 138 2 138 2 138 2 138
Total Liabilities 28 035 27 019 40 698 40 817 40 742 42 311 43 180 43 577 44 584 45 851 47 242
Equity
Common Stock, no par value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Additional paid-in capital 23 835 23 626 23 445 25 563 23 611 23 611 23 611 23 611 23 611 23 611 23 611
Retained Earnings 9 453 11 128 12 209 13 440 14 636 15 000 15 750 16 538 16 868 17 206 17 550
Accumulated other comprehensive losses -1 663 -3 069 -1 835 -5 994 -3 955 -3 955 -3 955 -3 955 -3 955 -3 955 -3 955
Treasury Stocks, at cost -2 032 -3 130 -6 524 -8 714 -8 416 -8 416 -8 416 -8 416 -8 416 -8 416 -8 416
Total Equity 29 593 28 555 27 295 22 356 25 972 26 240 26 990 27 778 28 108 28 446 28 790
Total Liabilities and Equity 57 628 55 574 67 993 63 173 66 714 68 551 70 170 71 354 72 692 74 297 76 032
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E
Long-term Debt 8 475 7 081 12 902 18 589 18 024 18 384 18 752 18 940 19 129 19 320 19 514
Short-term Debt 805 1 715 7 385 897 453 498 548 603 663 730 803
Debt 9 280 8 796 20 287 19 486 18 477 18 883 19 300 19 543 19 792 20 050 20 316
Cash and Cash Equivalents 316 239 567 1 244 2 101 2 206 2 316 2 432 2 554 2 681 2 816
Net Debt 8 964 8 557 19 720 18 242 16 376 16 677 16 984 17 110 17 239 17 368 17 501
Interest/Net Debt 7,08% 5,96% 3,06% 6,80% 7,55% 6,34% 6,34% 6,34% 6,34% 6,34% 6,34%
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E
Inventories 3 343 3 506 4 096 3 881 3 775 3 851 3 889 3 928 4 006 4 287 4 630
Trade Receivables 3 385 3 869 5 197 4 704 5 197 5 561 5 950 6 426 7 004 7 635 8 322
Trade Payables 2 270 2 602 4 065 3 373 3 766 4 030 4 352 4 744 5 265 5 897 6 664
WC 4 458 4 773 5 228 5 212 5 206 5 382 5 487 5 610 5 745 6 024 6 288
Change WC n.a. 315 455 -16 -6 176 105 123 135 279 263
Cash and Cash Equivalents 
Working Capital
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2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
FCFF 2 228 2 712 2 564 2 570 2 326 2 296
Terminal Value 62 431
Present Value @ WACC 2 228 2 552 2 270 2 141 1 824 47 756
58 772$      
Interest Tax Shield 300 299 297 296 294 292
Terminal Value 7 752
Present Value 300 281 263 247 231 5 935
Total PV ITS 7 258$        
Value Unlevered 58 772
PV(ITS) 7 258
PV (EBC) 3 918
62 111Enterprise Value
Adjusted Present Value (in millions of $)
Financial Distress Costs
Base Case Value
Evaluate Financing Side Effects
Appendix  11 - Kraft Food's Data
S ha re s * 1 482
P ric e 26,78$      
* Millions
9th November of 2009
Appendix  13 - Kraft Foods' FCFF Base Case
Appendix  12 - Kraft Foods' APV
Cost of Equity (L) 7,19%
Cost of Equity (U) 6,27%




Total Risk Premium 4,50%
Risk Premium 4,50%








Bear Growth Rate 2,20%
Bull Growth Rate 2,80%
CFD 50,0%
Prob. Of Default 13,3%
Equity 39 688$          
Net Debt 16 376$          
D/E 41%
Equity 25 972$          




2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E
EBIT 4 373 4 158 4 176 3 843 5 524 4 496 4 465 4 317 4 395 4 301 4 291
(-) Income Taxes 1 366 964 1 025 1 116 1 107 1 062 1 088 1 060 1 060
(+) Amortization and Depreciation 869 884 873 963 905 866 883 891 900 909 918
(-) Change in WC 0 315 455 -16 -6 661 144 170 198 355 356
(-) Capex 1 171 1 169 1 241 1 367 1 330 1 357 1 384 1 411 1 440 1 468 1 498
FCFF 4 071 3 558 1 987 2 491 4 080 2 228 2 712 2 564 2 570 2 326 2 296
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
FCFF 4 071 3 558 1 987 2 491 4 080 2 228 2 712 2 564 2 570 2 326 2 296
Terminal Value 66 209
Present Value @ WACC 2 228 2 557 2 280 2 154 1 839 51 059
62 117$      
Free Cash Flow (in millions of $)
Discount Cash Flow (in millions of $)
Base Case DFC Value
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Appendix  15 - Kraft Foods' Bear Case (FCFF and APV)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
EBIT 4 373 4 158 4 176 3 843 5 524 4 322 4 280 4 252 4 375 4 280 4 396
(-) Income Taxes 1 366 964 1 025 1 116 1 107 1 062 1 088 1 060 1 060
(+) Amortization and Depreciation 869 884 873 963 905 866 883 891 900 909 918
(-) Change in WC 0 315 455 -16 -6 661 144 170 198 355 356
(-) Capex 1 171 1 169 1 241 1 367 1 330 1 357 1 384 1 411 1 440 1 468 1 498
FCFF 4 071 3 558 1 987 2 491 4 080 2 054 2 527 2 499 2 549 2 305 2 400
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
FCFF 4 071 3 558 1 987 2 491 4 080 2 054 2 527 2 499 2 549 2 305 2 400
Terminal Value 63 638
Present Value @ WACC 2 054 2 383 2 222 2 137 1 822 49 220
59 838$   
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
FCFF 4 071 3 558 1 987 2 491 4 080 2 054 2 527 2 499 2 549 2 305 2 400
Terminal Value 58 977
Present Value @ WACC 2 054 2 378 2 213 2 124 1 807 45 285
55 860$   
Interest Tax Shield 165 157 363 336 301 300 299 297 296 294 292
Terminal Value 7 181
Present Value 300 281 263 247 231 5 514
Total PV ITS 6 836$      
Value Unlevered 55 860
PV (ITS) 6 836
P(D)xCFD 3 724
58 973$   Enterprise Value
Free Cash Flow (in millions)
Discount Cash Flow (in millions)
Adjusted Present Value (in millions)
Financial Distress Costs
Base Case DFC Value
Base Case Value
Evaluate Financing Side Effects
Appendix  14 - Kraft Foods' Bull Case (WACC and APV)
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
EBIT 4 373 4 158 4 176 3 843 5 524 5 305 5 332 5 267 5 237 5 130 5 075
(-) Income Taxes 1 366 964 1 025 1 116 1 107 1 062 1 088 1 060 1 060
(+) Amortization and Depreciation 869 884 873 963 905 866 883 891 900 909 918
(-) Change in WC 0 315 455 -16 -6 661 144 170 198 355 356
(-) Capex 1 171 1 169 1 241 1 367 1 330 1 357 1 384 1 411 1 440 1 468 1 498
FCFF 4 071 3 558 1 987 2 491 4 080 3 037 3 553 3 579 3 441 3 263 3 135
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
FCFF 4 071 3 558 1 987 2 491 4 080 3 037 3 553 3 579 3 441 3 263 3 135
Terminal Value 96 306
Present Value @ WACC 3 037 3 350 3 182 2 885 2 579 74 116
89 148$   
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
FCFF 4 071 3 558 1 987 2 491 4 080 3 037 3 553 3 579 3 441 3 263 3 135
Terminal Value 92 864
Present Value @ WACC 3 037 3 343 3 169 2 867 2 558 70 829
85 803$   
Interest Tax Shield 165 157 363 336 301 300 299 297 296 294 292
Terminal Value 8 658
Present Value 300 281 263 247 231 6 604




88 009$       
Free Cash Flow (in millions)
Discount Cash Flow (in millions)
Adjusted Present Value (in millions)






Evaluate Financing Side Effects
Financial Distress Costs
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Appendix  16 – Kraft Foods’ Cases
( in m illio n ) B a s e  C a s e B e a r C a s e B ull C a s e
EV WACC 62 117$          59 838$     89 148$       
EV APV 62 111$          58 973$     88 009$       
Net Debt 16 376$          16 376$     16 376$       
Equity WACC 45 741$          43 462$     72 772$       
Equity APV 45 735$          42 597$     71 633$       
30,86$            29,33$       49,10$         
30,86$            28,74$       48,34$         
T a rg e t P ric e
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Appendix  17 - Cadbury's Income Statement
Cadbury Income Statement (million of £) 2007-2008 2010-2015
2007 2008 2009* CAGR % 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E CAGR % 
Revenues 4 699 5 384 5 975 12,8% 6 160 6 383 6 698 7 088 7 502 7 942 5%#DIV/0! #DIV/0!
BIMA 1 579 1 672 1 820 7,4% 1 893 1 950 2 047 2 149 2 257 2 392 5%
% Change Y/Y - 5,9% 8,9% 4,0% 3,0% 5,0% 5,0% 5,0% 6,0%
Europe 879 1 097 1 117 12,7% 1 128 1 162 1 208 1 269 1 332 1 399 4%
% Change Y/Y - 24,8% 1,8% 1,0% 3,0% 4,0% 5,0% 5,0% 5,0%
Americas 1 372 1 631 1 826 15,4% 1 899 1 994 2 114 2 262 2 420 2 613 7%
% Change Y/Y - 18,9% 12,0% 4,0% 5,0% 6,0% 7,0% 7,0% 8,0%
Pacific-Asia 860 1 002 1 204 18,3% 1 240 1 277 1 328 1 408 1 493 1 537 4%
% Change Y/Y - 16,5% 20,2% 3,0% 3,0% 4,0% 6,0% 6,0% 3,0%
Central 9 9 8 -5,7% 8 8 8 8 8 8 0%
Cost of Sales 2 504 2 870 3 210 13,2% 3 326 3 447 3 617 3 828 4 051 4 289 5%
% COGS margin 53% 53% 54% - 54% 54% 54% 54% 54% 54%
Gross Profit 2 195 2 514 2 765 12,2% 2 834 2 936 3 081 3 261 3 451 3 653 5%#DIV/0! #DIV/0!
Trading Costs 1 754 1 933 2 005 6,9% 2 133 2 286 2 472 2 689 2 908 3 133 8%#DIV/0! #DIV/0!
Distribution 241 247 262 4,3% 270 281 292 306 322 338 4,6%
Marketing 487 584 629 13,6% 704 789 892 1 016 1 138 1 275 12,6%
Administration 1 008 1 098 1 110 4,9% 1 154 1 212 1 285 1 362 1 444 1 516 5,6%
Amortization of definitive life acquisition intagible 5 4 4 - 4 4 4 4 4 4 -
Impairment Goodwill 13 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 -
Restructuring Costs 165 194 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 -
Non-Trading Itens 2 1 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 0 -
Profit from Operations 278 388 808 - 705 654 613 576 547 525 -
EBITDA 281 394 811 - 709 658 617 580 551 529 -
EBITDA Margin % 6% 7% 14% - 11% 10% 9% 8% 8% 7% -
Share of Results in Associates 8 10 7 - 8 8 8 8 8 8 -
Profit before Financing and Taxation (EBIT) 286 398 815 - 713 662 621 584 555 533 -
Investment Revenue 56 52 33 - 33 31 28 26 23 21 -
Finance Costs -88 -50 -134 - -90 -90 -91 -91 -92 -92 -
Profit Before Taxation 254 400 714 - 656 603 558 518 487 462 -
Taxation -105 -30 -197 - -184 -169 -156 -145 -136 -129 -
Profit from the period from continuing operations 149 370 517 - 472 434 402 373 350 332 -
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Appendix  18 - Cadbury's Balance Sheet
Cadbury Balance Sheet (in million of £)
2007 2008 2009 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E
Assets
Non-Current Assets 8 667 5 990 5 996 5 946 5 956 5 966 5 985 6 005 6 024
Goodwill 2 805 2 288 2 176 2 176 2 176 2 176 2 176 2 176 2 176
Acquisition of Intangibles 3 378 1 598 1 518 1 518 1 518 1 518 1 518 1 518 1 518
Software and other Intangibles 149 87 108 109 109 110 110 111 111
Property, Land and Equipment 1 904 1 761 1 859 1 868 1 878 1 887 1 906 1 925 1 944
Investment in Associates 32 28 28 28 28 28 28 28 28
Investment in Subsidiaries 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Deferred Tax Assets 124 181 241 190 190 190 190 190 190
Retirement Benefit Assets 223 17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Trade and other receivables 50 26 55 55 55 55 55 55 55
Other Investments 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
Current Assets 2 600 2 635 2 125 2 407 2 463 2 540 2 642 2 674 2 786
Inventories 821 767 748 801 830 871 921 900 953
Short-term Investments 79 106 29 30 32 36 41 49 56
Trade and other receivables 1 197 1 067 978 1 013 1 049 1 101 1 165 1 233 1 306
Tax recoverable 41 35 42 42 42 42 42 42 42
Cash and Cash Equivalents 416 390 237 226 215 195 178 154 134
Derivative Financial Instruments 46 268 91 100 100 100 100 100 100
Assets held for sale 71 270 8 135 135 135 135 135 135
Total Assets 11 338 8 895 8 129 8 353 8 419 8 505 8 627 8 679 8 811
Liabilities
Current Liabilities 4 614 3 388 2 434 2 340 2 395 2 459 2 543 2 633 2 730
Trade and other payables 1 701 1 551 1 577 1 519 1 574 1 651 1 748 1 850 1 958
Tax payable 197 328 226 250 250 250 250 250 250
Short-term borrowings and overdrafts 2 562 1 189 267 280 280 267 254 242 231
Short-term provisions 111 150 269 170 170 170 170 170 170
Obligations under financial leases 21 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Derivative financial instruments 22 169 94 120 120 120 120 120 120
Non-Current Liabilities 2 533 1 876 2 173 2 430 -461 2 309 -468 2 364 -386
Trade and Other Receivables 37 61 65 246 187 125 180 180 262
Borrowings 1 120 1 194 1 349 1 416 -1 416 1 416 -1 416 1 416 -1 416
Retirement benefit obligations 143 275 504 500 500 500 500 500 500
Tax Payable 16 6 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Deferred tax Liabilities 1 145 121 163 163 163 163 163 163 163
Long-term provisions 61 218 84 100 100 100 100 100 100
Obligations under financial leases 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Derivative financial instruments 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total Liabilities 7 165 5 361 4 607 -4 844 -4 910 -5 025 -5 290 -5 486 -5 766
Equity
Share Capital 264 136 137 137 137 137 137 137 137
Share Premium account 1225 38 97 97 97 97 97 97 97
Other reserves -4 850 654 654 654 625 482 654 654
Retained Earnings 2677 2498 2614 2614 2614 2614 2614 2298 2150
Equity (Parent) 4162 3522 3502 3502 3502 3473 3330 3186 3038
Minority Interests 11 12 20 7 7 7 7 7 7
Total Equity 4 173 3 534 3 522 3 509 3 509 3 480 3 337 3 193 3 045
Total Liabilities and Equity 11 338 8 895 8 129 8 353 8 419 8 505 8 627 8 679 8 811
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Appendix  19 - Cadbury's Net Debt and WC
2007 2008 2009 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E
Long-term Debt 1 120 1 194 1 349 1 416 1 416 1 416 1 416 1 416 1 416
Short-term Debt 2 562 1 189 267 280 280 267 254 242 231
Debt 3 682 2 383 1 616 1 697 1 697 1 683 1 671 1 659 1 647
Cash and Cash Equivalents 416 390 237 226 215 195 178 154 134
Net Debt 3 266 1 993 1 379 1 471 1 482 1 488 1 493 1 504 1 513
Interest/Net Debt 2,69% 2,51% 9,72% 6,10% 6,10% 6,10% 6,10% 6,10% 6,10%
2007 2008 2009 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E
Inventories 821 767 748 801 830 871 921 900 953
Trade Receivables 1 197 1 067 978 1 013 1 049 1 101 1 165 1 233 1 306
Trade Payables -1 701 -1 551 -1 577 -1 519 -1 574 -1 651 -1 748 -1 850 -1 958
WC 317 283 149 295 305 320 339 284 300
Change WC n.a. -34 -134 146 11 15 19 -55 17
Net Debt 
Working Capital
Appendix  20 - Cadbury's Data
Cost of Equity (L) 7,89%
Cost of Equity (U) 6,85%




Total Risk Premium 4,50%
Risk Premium 4,50%









Prob. Of Default 8,3%
Market Capitalization 10 354£       17 311$        
Net Debt 1 379£         2 306$          
D/E 13% 13%
Equity 3 522£         5 888$          




9th November of 2009
Shares 1 366
Share Price 7,58£       
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Appendix  21 - Cadbury's FCFF
Appendix  22 - Cadbury's APV
2007 2008 2009 2010E 53% 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E
EBIT 286 398 815 713 662 621 584 555 533
(-) Income Taxes 105 30 197 184 169 156 145 136 129
(+) Amortization and Depreciation 295 294 294 320 322 323 327 330 333
(-) Change in WC 0 -34 -134 146 11 15 19 -55 17
(-) Capex 352 500 408 404 340 342 345 349 352
FCFF 124 196 638 300 465 431 401 455 368
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
FCFF 124 196 638 300 465 431 401 455 368
Terminal Value 8 911
Present Value @ WACC 300 435 378 330 351 6 700
8 495£    
Free Cash Flow (in millions of £)
Discount Cash Flow (in millions of £)
Base Case DFC Value
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
FCFF 124 196 638 300 465 431 401 455 368
Terminal Value 8 672
Present Value @ WACC 300 435 378 329 349 6 492
8 283£    
Interest Tax Shield 25 25 25 26 26 26
Terminal Value 595
Present Value 25 24 22 21 20 446
Total PV ITS 557£       
Value Unlevered 8 283
PV(ITS) 557
PV(EBC) 345
Enterprise Value 8 495£    
Base Case Value
Evaluate Financing Side Effects
Financial Distress Costs
Adjusted Present Value (in millions of £)
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Appendix  23 -Cadbury's Bear Case (FCFF and APV)
2007 2008 2009 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E
EBIT 286 398 815 662 611 549 487 444 462
(-) Income Taxes 105 30 197 175 160 141 122 109 113
(+) Amortization and Depreciation 290 249 318 320 322 323 327 330 333
(-) Change in WC 0 -34 -134 146 11 15 19 -55 17
(-) Capex 352 500 408 410 412 414 418 422 427
FCFF 119 151 662 252 351 302 254 297 239
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
FCFF 119 151 662 252 351 302 254 297 239
Terminal Value 5 788
Present Value @ WACC 252 329 265 209 229 4 352
5 637£    
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
FCFF 119 151 662 252 351 302 254 297 239
Terminal Value 5 495
Present Value @ WACC 252 328 265 209 228 4 118
5 400£    
Interest Tax Shield 56 34 24 25 25 25 26 26 26
Terminal Value 595
Present Value 25 24 22 21 20 446
Total PV ITS 557£       
Value Unlevered 5 400
PV (ITS) 557
PV(EBC) 225
Enterprise Value 5 732£    
Evaluate Financing Side Effects
Financial Distress Costs
Free Cash Flow (in millions of £)
Discount Cash Flow (in millions of £)
Adjusted Present Value (in millions of £)
Base Case DFC Value
Base Case Value
Sara de Paula Ribeiro                       The Case of Kraft Foods and Cadbury                   97
Appendix  24 - Cadbury's Bull Case ( FCFF and APV)
Appendix  25 - Cadbury's Cases
2007 2008 2009 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E
EBIT 286 398 815 771 734 705 664 651 684
(-) Income Taxes 105 30 197 190 179 169 156 150 157
(+) Amortization and Depreciation 290 249 318 320 322 323 327 330 333
(-) Change in WC 0 -34 -134 0 146 11 15 19 -55
(-) Capex 352 500 408 410 412 414 418 422 427
FCFF 119 151 662 491 319 435 401 389 488
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
FCFF 119 151 662 491 319 435 401 389 488
Terminal Value 11 830
Present Value @ WACC 491 299 381 330 300 8 895
10 696£  
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
FCFF 119 151 662 491 319 435 401 389 488
Terminal Value 11 231
Present Value @ WACC 491 299 381 329 298 8 416
10 214£  
Interest Tax Shield 56 34 24 25 25 25 26 26 26
Terminal Value 595
Present Value 25 24 22 21 20 446
Total PV ITS 557£       
Value Unlevered 10 214
PV (ITS) 557
PV (EBC) 425
Enterprise Value 10 346£  
Evaluate Financing Side Effects
Financial Distress Costs
Free Cash Flow (in millions of £)
Discount Cash Flow (in millions of £)
Adjusted Present Value (in millions of £)
Base Case DFC Value
Base Case APV
( in m illio n ) B a s e  C a s e B e a r C a s e B ull C a s e
EV WACC 8 495£         5 637£         10 696£       
EV APV 8 495£         5 732£         10 346£       
Net Debt 1 379£         1 379£         1 379£         
Equity WACC 7 116£         4 258£         9 317£         
Equity APV 7 116£         4 353£         8 967£         
5,21£           3,12£           6,82£           
5,21£           3,19£           6,56£           
T a rg e t P ric e
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Appendix  26 - Merger With No Synergy Income Statement
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Total Net Revenues 32 779 33 018 43 714 50 979 50 386 52 115 53 468 54 521 56 160 57 360 59 224
Cost of Sales 21 115 21 190 27 842 32 886 31 153 32 069 32 890 33 457 34 410 35 072 36 174
Gross Profit 11 664 11 828 15 872 18 092 19 233 20 046 20 578 21 063 21 750 22 287 23 050
Distribution 0 0 403 413 438 451 469 488 512 538 565
Marketing 1 314 1 396 2 285 2 615 2 700 2 941 3 206 3 453 3 740 4 026 4 381
G&A 5 436 5 434 7 359 8 561 8 839 8 983 9 291 9 630 9 909 10 198 10 553
R&D 385 419 442 498 477 496 526 557 585 615 645
Amortization of definitive life acquis ition intangible 10 7 21 30 33 22 22 22 22 22 22
Asset Impairment and Exit Cos ts 478 1 062 440 1 024 -64 500 500 500 500 500 500
Impairment Goodwill -108 -117 7 92 6 -50 -50 -50 -50 -50 -50
Restructuring Costs 263 310 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Non-trading itens 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Shares of Results  in Associates 0 0 13 16 11 13 13 13 13 13 13
Profit Before Financing and Taxation (EBIT) 4 889 5 517 5 528 6 764 6 677 7 590 7 501 7 350 7 419 7 326 7 321
Investment Revenue 0 0 94 87 55 55 52 47 43 39 36
Finance Costs -635 -510 -751 -1 324 -1 461 -1 184 -1 182 -1 184 -1 188 -1 189 -1 188
Profit Before Taxation (EBT) 4 254 5 007 4 871 5 528 5 272 6 460 6 371 6 213 6 274 6 176 6 168
Taxation 1 340 1 577 1 534 1 741 1 661 2 035 2 007 1 957 1 976 1 946 1 943
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Appendix  27 - Merger With Synergy Income Statement
Income Statement 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2014E 2015E
Net Revenues Cadbury 10 312 10 685 11 211 11 864 12 556 13 292
Net Revenues Kraft Foods 40 781 41 735 42 241 43 195 43 680 44 771
Total Net Revenues 51 093 52 420 53 452 55 059 56 235 58 063
Cost of Sales  Cadbury 5 562 5 763 6 001 6 333 6 681 7 073
Cost of Sales  Kraft Foods 21 206 27 128 27 456 28 077 28 392 29 101
Cost of Sales 26 768 32 890 33 457 34 410 35 072 36 174
Gross Profit 24 326 19 530 19 994 20 649 21 163 21 889
Operating Costs 12 080 12 605 13 170 13 721 14 282 14 976
Distribution 307 319 332 348 366 384
Marketing Cadbury 1 013 1 134 1 282 1 461 1 637 1 833
Marketing Kraft Foods 1 763 1 887 1 962 2 041 2 122 2 250
Marketing 2 776 3 021 3 244 3 502 3 759 4 083
G&A Cadbury 1 496 1 571 1 665 1 765 1 871 1 964
G&A Kraft Foods 7 053 7 264 7 482 7 632 7 785 8 018
G&A 8 549 8 835 9 147 9 397 9 655 9 982
R&D 448 429 446 473 502 527
Operating Income 12 246 6 925 6 825 6 928 6 881 6 913
Amortization of definitive life acquisition intangible 33 22 22 22 22 22
Asset Impairment and Exit Costs 500 500 500 500 500 500
Impairment Goodwill -50 -50 -50 -50 -50 -50
Restructuring Costs 0 0 0 0 0 0
Non-trading itens 0 0 0 0 0 0
Shares of Results in Associates 13 13 13 13 13 13
Profit Before Financing and Taxation (EBIT) 12 650 7 340 7 240 7 344 7 296 7 328
Investment Revenue Cadbury 55 52 47 43 39 36
Investment Revenue 55 52 47 43 39 36
Finance Cost Cadbury -150 -151 -159 -168 -174 -181
Finance Cost Kraft Foods -1 971 -1 975 -1 985 -1 995 -2 006 -2 014
Finance Costs -2 121 -2 126 -2 144 -2 163 -2 180 -2 195
Profit Before Taxation (EBT) 10 584 5 267 5 143 5 224 5 155 5 168
Taxation 3 334 1 659 1 620 1 645 1 624 1 628
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Appendix  28 - Merger FCFF and APV
Appendix  29 - Meet the Premium Line Calculations
in million of $
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
EBIT 12 650 7 340 7 240 7 344 7 296 7 328
Income Taxes 3 334 1 659 1 620 1 645 1 624 1 628
Amortization & Depreciation 33 22 22 22 22 22
Change in WC 668 616 655 696 747 759
Capex 2 032 1 952 1 983 2 017 2 051 2 086
FCFF 6 649 3 135 3 004 3 008 2 896 2 877
FCFF 6 649 3 135 3 004 3 008 2 896 2 877
Terminal Value 82 415
PV 6 649 2 956 2 670 2 520 2 287 63 501
Base Case @ WACC 80 583
in million of $
APV 6 649 3 135 3 004 3 008 2 896 2 877
Terminal Value 77 070
PV 6 649 2 949 2 658 2 502 2 266 58 831
Base Case 75 855
Interest Tax Shield 373 372 373 374 375 374
Terminal Value 9 783
Present Value 373 350 330 311 293 7 475
Total PV ITS 9 132
75 855
9 132






2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Cadbury's Revenues 6 168 6 168 6 168 6 168 6 168 6 168
M&A Revenue Synergy 1 022 1 048 1 069 1 101 1 125 1 161
% SynR 16,57% 17,00% 17,33% 17,85% 18,23% 18,83%
Discount Factor 15,14% 16,57% 15,99% 15,33% 14,85% 14,27% 13,85%
Cadbury's Costs 7 588 7 588 7 588 7 588 7 588 7 588
M&A Cost Synergy 793 839 898 967 1 037 1 108
% SynC 10,45% 11,05% 11,83% 12,74% 13,67% 14,60%
Discount Factor 10,56% 10,45% 10,39% 10,47% 10,60% 10,70% 10,74%
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